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Profit Shifting of Multinational Corporations Worldwide 
 





Multinational corporations (MNCs) avoid taxes by shifting their profits from countries where 
real activity takes place towards tax havens, depriving governments worldwide of billions of 
tax revenue. Earlier research investigating the scale and distribution of profit shifting has 
faced methodological and data challenges, both of which we address. First, we propose a 
logarithmic function to model the extremely non-linear relationship between the location of 
profits and tax rates faced by MNCs at those locations – that is, the extreme concentration of 
profits without corresponding economic activity in a small number of low-tax jurisdictions. We 
show that the logarithmic model allows for a more accurate identification of profit shifting than 
linear and quadratic models. Second, we apply the logarithmic model to newly available 
country-by-country reporting data for large MNCs – this provides information on the activities 
of large MNCs, including for the first time many low- and lower-middle-income countries.  
 
We estimate that MNCs shifted US$1 trillion of profits to tax havens in 2016, which implies 
approximately US$200-300 billion in tax revenue losses worldwide. MNCs headquartered in 
the United States and Bermuda are the most aggressive at shifting profits towards tax 
havens, while MNCs headquartered in India, China, Mexico and South Africa the least. We 
establish which countries gain and lose most from profit shifting: the Cayman Islands, 
Luxembourg, Bermuda, Hong Kong and the Netherlands are among the most important tax 
havens, whereas low- and lower-middle-income countries tend to lose more tax revenue 
relative to their total tax revenue. Our findings thus support the arguments of low- and lower-
middle-income countries that they should be represented on an equal footing during 
international corporate tax reform debates. 
 
Keywords: multinational corporation; corporate taxation; profit shifting; effective tax rate; 
country-by-country reporting; global development. 
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1  Introduction 
 
One reason why globalisation is viewed as inequitable is corporate tax avoidance. If 
multinational corporations (MNCs), which benefit from globalisation, exploit it to avoid paying 
taxes, it is no surprise that other taxpayers view this as inequitable. Publicised case studies, 
such as those based on the Panama and Paradise Papers, have detailed how little some 
large MNCs pay in corporate income tax as a result of their use of low-tax jurisdictions or tax 
havens. A simplified description of such behaviour would be that MNCs carry out their 
activities and generate profits in a variety of countries worldwide, but shift a large share of 
those profits to tax havens. To what extent this represents a general pattern has so far 
remained unclear. Despite recent growth in research interest in corporate tax avoidance, we 
still lack reliable information on the scale of profit shifting, and on the origin and destination of 
those profits. 
 
This paper develops a novel methodology and exploits a new dataset to address the 
question of the scale of profit shifting of MNCs worldwide. On the one hand, we ask which 
are the most important tax havens, the amount of profits shifted to them, and what share of 
the profits reported in tax havens have been shifted there. On the other hand, we address 
the question of which countries tend to lose more tax revenue from profit shifting, both 
absolutely and relative to their total tax revenue. In addition to country-level results, we 
investigate whether profit shifting affects countries differently according to their region or their 
income level. Moreover, we examine whether MNCs differ in the aggressiveness of their tax 
planning depending on the country of their headquarters. The current lack of definitive 
answers to these intrinsically linked questions is the result of methodological and data 
challenges that we address in this paper, with two innovations. 
 
As the first, methodological contribution, we propose a logarithmic function to model the 
extremely non-linear relationship between the location of profits and the tax rates of MNCs. 
In estimating the semi-elasticity of profits to tax rates, we build on the literature that 
confirmed the existence of profit shifting, pioneered by Hines and Rice (1994). Its headline 
specification of that approach assumes a linear semi-elasticity, which Dowd et al. (2017) 
show to underestimate profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions, and propose a quadratic semi-
elasticity instead. While it is an improvement, we show that this quadratic model is still not 
able to capture the empirically observed extreme non-linearity in the data: 85-90 per cent of 
profit shifted takes place towards countries with tax rates below 10%. In this paper, we 
introduce a logarithmic model to fully capture the extreme non-linearity of the semi-elasticity 
of profits to tax rates. 
 
Our second innovation is to pioneer the use of country-by-country reporting (CBCR) data, 
detailing the activities, profits and taxes of large MNCs in 195 countries, aggregated at the 
headquarter country level. This unique data was first made available by the OECD in July 
2020, thanks to a new regulation that requires all large MNCs to report in every country, 
including tax havens. While it includes the most reliable country-level information about the 
tax payments and profits of MNCs worldwide, it only covers the year 2016, when reporting by 
companies was not yet mandatory in all countries, aggregates small countries into categories 
(e.g. ‘Other Africa’), and might be prone to limited double-counting in profits due to confusion 
in intercompany dividends and so-called stateless entities. We address these concerns by 
excluding stateless entities, developing a method to estimate missing data, disaggregating 
categories into individual countries, and using data for 2017 for the United States – the only 




We apply the logarithmic model to the CBCR data to establish the scale and distribution of 
profit shifting in many countries worldwide, revealing four main findings. First, MNCs shifted 
US$1 trillion of profits to tax havens in 2016, which in turn implies US$200-300 billion in 
revenue losses for other countries. The overall estimated scale of profit shifting is similar 
whether we use logarithmic or quadratic function to model the relationship between the 
location of profits and tax rates, or a simpler model measuring the misalignment between 
profits and economic activity. Our total estimates of profit shifting are broadly comparable to, 
or somewhat higher than, existing estimates such as Tørsløv et al. (2020), who estimate 
profit shifting to be over US$600 billion in 2015, albeit using a smaller sample of countries. 
 
Second, we estimate which are the most important tax havens. The large majority of shifted 
profits are shifted to ten countries with extremely low effective tax rates (ETRs). Moreover, 
over 75 per cent of the profits booked in those ten countries are artificially shifted there. The 
Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Singapore, Bermuda and 
Puerto Rico are the largest profit shifting destinations. In contrast with the consistent 
estimates across models of the overall scale, the most important tax havens – as well as the 
countries affected by them – differ substantially between models. Both the logarithmic and 
misalignment models find that countries with ETRs below 1 per cent account for 40 per cent 
of profit shifting, while the linear and quadratic model find that they account for 30 per cent. 
Similarly, countries with ETRs above 10 per cent account for 9-18 per cent of profit shifting in 
the logarithmic and misalignment model, but 27-30 per cent in the linear and quadratic 
models. 
 
Third, we contribute to the ongoing discussion of which countries lose more tax revenue due 
to profit shifting, equipped with new data on MNCs. This data has much higher country 
coverage (195 countries), including many lower-income countries for the first time. We find 
that lower-income countries tend to lose more tax revenue due to profit shifting relative to 
their total tax revenue, directly contravening one of the goals of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development: to ‘Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through 
international support to lower-income countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and 
other revenue collection’.  In addition, we find that among the affected high-income countries, 
the United States is estimated to suffer the most from profit shifting in absolute terms 
according to most of the methods, while Germany and France are estimated to lose between 
one quarter and two-thirds of their profit base due to profit shifting. 
 
With these findings we contribute to the ongoing discussion of which countries lose more to 
profit shifting. Few existing studies identify how countries in various income groups are 
distinctly affected by profit shifting, and the nature of these differences varies across the 
studies. On the one hand, the theoretical case for such countries’ higher vulnerability is 
strong (Hearson 2018), and several studies indicate that low- and lower-middle-income 
countries (which we label as lower-income countries) are more vulnerable to profit shifting by 
MNCs than countries at higher levels of income (Fuest et al. 2011; Johannesen et al. 2020). 
On the other hand, Janský and Palanský (2019) compare five sets of country-level estimates 
– Clausing (2016), Cobham and Janský (2018, 2019), Tørsløv et al. (2020) and their own 
estimates – and four of the five do not suggest that lower-income countries are 
disproportionately affected by profit shifting.  
 
Fourth, MNCs headquartered in the US and Bermuda are the most aggressive in terms of 
profit shifting, among headquarter countries with available data. In contrast, we find no 
evidence of profit shifting towards tax havens by MNCs headquartered in India, Mexico, 
South Africa or China. While most previous research has been carried out on US-
headquartered MNCs due to data availability, our results highlight that these are not 
necessarily representative of the universe of all MNCs, and that there are important 
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differences across countries. Consequently, policymakers might negotiate international 
agreements differently if they know how aggressive their MNCs and other countries’ MNCs 
are in terms of profit shifting. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the new logarithmic model to 
estimate the scale and distribution of profit shifting to tax havens, and compares it with 
specifications found in existing literature. We then describe how we reallocate the shifted 
profit from tax havens to other countries, as well as the so-called misalignment model as an 
alternative to the semi-elasticity model. Section 3 details the available datasets used to 
estimate profit shifting, focusing on the country-by-country data released by the OECD in 
July 2020. Section 4 shows how our methodology improves profit shifting estimation using 
US CBCR data, applies the methodology to the OECD CBCR data to obtain global 
estimates, and describes how profit shifting differs by countries’ per capita income. In Section 
4, we also summarise the 12 robustness checks and sensitivity analyses with which we show 
that our findings are robust to changes in the methodology. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2  Methodology for estimating profit shifting 
 
In this section we first introduce the traditional methodology for estimating profit shifting using 
linear and quadratic specifications (Section 2.1). We then detail our logarithmic specification 
as this paper’s preferred way of estimating the scale of profit shifting to tax havens (Section 
2.2). We proceed to describe how the shifted profit is reallocated from tax havens to other 
countries on the basis of economic activity (Section 2.3). Finally, we describe how we apply 
that shifted profit reallocation’s logic to estimate the scale of profit shifting itself as the so-
called misalignment model (Section 2.4). 
 
2.1 Semi-elasticity model 
 
MNCs can, and many of them do, engage in shifting profit to tax havens where they seek 
lower taxation of their profits – an excellent review of the literature is provided by Beer et al. 
(2020a). Consequently, the profit booked in a jurisdiction i by MNCs (πi ) can be expressed 
as sum of the ‘real unobserved profits’ (pi ) and profits shifted into the jurisdiction (Si ) minus 
the cost of profit shifting incurred by the MNCs (ci ): 
 
 πi = pi + Si − ci . (1) 
 
While various methodologies have been used to estimate profit shifting (e.g. Alvarez-
Martinez et al. 2018; Auerbach et al. 2017; Crivelli et al. 2016; Dharmapala and Riedel 2013; 
Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Weichenrieder 2009), profit shifting is most frequently modelled 
using the method proposed by Hines and Rice (1994). This method assumes that the cost of 
profit shifting increases quadratically with the fraction of profit shifted. The booked profits (π ) 
is maximised subject to the existence of profit shifting, and approximated using either first-
order or second-order Taylor expansions. Subsequently, theoretical profits are identified with 
the Cobb-Douglas production function, yielding equation 2 for the first-order Taylor 
expansion (the most commonly used specification), and equation 3 for the second-order 
Taylor expansion. 
 
 log (πi ) = β0 + β1 log (Ki ) + β2 log (Li ) + β3(τi ) + βχχ + є , (2) 
 
where πi  represents profits booked in country i, including both real profit and profit shifted, 
and Ki  and Li  are the capital and labour components of the Cobb-Douglas production 
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function, usually operationalised with total tangible assets and wages. τi  is either the tax rate 
of the subsidiary, the difference of tax rates between the subsidiary and the parent, or, less 
frequently (due to lacking data), between the subsidiary and other subsidiaries, and χ are 
controls including, for example, GDP per capita and population. 
 
 log (πi ) = β0 + β1 log (Ki ) + β2 log (Li ) + β3(τi ) + β4 (τi )2 + βχχ + є ,                        (3) 
 
Both equations are currently viewed as traditional methods. However, follow-up studies use 
equation 2 and its modifications much more than equation 3. Recent research has revisited 
the possibility of significant curvature in the relationship between tax rates and reported 
profits. In particular, Dowd et al. (2017) apply equation 3 to a panel dataset of US tax returns 
over the period 2002-2012 and find that the effect of tax on profit shifting is not linear – that 
incentive to shift profits from a country with a tax rate of 20 per cent to one with a tax rate of 
0 per cent is more than double compared to incentive to shift profits from a country with a tax 
rate of 20 per cent to one with a tax rate of 10 per cent. Dowd et al. (2017) account for this 
non-linearity by including a quadratic term. 
 
2.2 Addressing the extreme non-linearity: a logarithmic model 
 
In this paper, we argue that the non-linearity of tax semi-elasticity is too extreme to be 
adequately accounted for using linear or quadratic models. We argue that the assumption of 
the quadratic relationship between the fraction of profit shifted and the cost of profit shifting, 
while suitable for the transfer pricing of physical goods where arm-length prices are more 
readily available, is not suitable for profit shifting strategies based on financial assets such as 
intellectual property or intra-group lending. In these strategies, the costs of profit shifting are 
largely fixed. As such, the cost as a fraction of profits shifted is high for low fractions of profit 
shifted and decreases subsequently (Dischinger and Riedel 2011). Moreover, these costs 
are comparable regardless of which tax haven profits are shifted to. As such, firms have an 
incentive to shift profits toward the tax havens with the lowest effective taxation available, not 
merely to countries with lower ETR, and models including a logarithmic semi-elasticity would 
more effectively model profit shifting. 
 
This theoretical prediction is empirically backed by three empirical observations. The first is 
the extreme non-linearity in the profitability of firms in tax havens. The reported profit per 
employee is relatively constant around US$30,000 to US$50,000 per employee in all 
countries with an ETR above 10 per cent, and exponentially increases as the ETR falls below 
that level (Figure A2). The second is the empirical results by Dowd et al. (2017). Their 
discontinuity model yields semi-elasticities for ETR below 10 per cent twice as large as their 
quadratic model, indicating that the extreme non-linearity is not fully captured with a 
quadratic term. The third is our data-driven exploration of the data (see Appendix C), in 
which we used symbolic regression to obtain the models that best fitted the data. All these 
models included a term that allows for extreme non-linearity semi-elasticities: the logarithmic 
term. 
 
In order to model the extreme non-linearity, we propose to modify the equation as follows: 
 
 log (πi ) = β0 + β1 log (Ki ) + β2 log (Li ) + β3(τi ) + β4 log (t + τi ) + βχχ + є . (4) 
 
We argue that including the logarithmic term enables us to capture the extreme non-linearity 
better than by including the quadratic term, and we show this empirically in the results 
section. In equation 4, τ is the tax rate faced by the subsidiary that we proxy by ETRs. 
Overall, ETRs are a better alternative than statutory rates, since ETRs are more realistic and 
more likely to be used by MNCs for making profit shifting decisions (despite the downside of 
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ETRs being potentially endogenous to profit shifting, since, for example, governments might 
lower ETRs to attract shifted profits). t  is an offset parameter, included in order to avoid 
obtaining extremely high differences in the tax semi-elasticity for countries with similar but 
extremely low tax rates. We obtain the optimal value of the offset (0.0014 for US data and 
0.0007 for OECD data) numerically by iterating over the range 0-1 and keeping the value that 
minimises the Bayesian Information Criterion. In section 4.4 we show that our results are 
highly robust to the choice of the offset, and that including this parameter in the linear and 
quadratic models does not increase their predictive power. 
 
We further include headquarter-country fixed effects to account for differences in profitability 
and data reporting methods between MNCs headquartered in different countries, and 
interaction terms between the country fixed effects and log (t +τi ), which capture differences 
in the profit shifting aggressiveness of the MNCs of different reporting countries. 
 
Consistently with the literature, we operationalise capital (K ) using tangible assets, and 
labour (L) using wages. A limitation of the operationalisation of the capital component 
through tangible assets is that tangible assets are affected by profit shifting strategies. For 
example, US MNCs in Luxembourg report the second highest value of tangible assets in 
Europe according to the CBCR data, with a combined value of US$220 billion (the value 
reported in Germany, France and all of Africa combined). As a consequence, using tangible 
assets will yield conservative estimates of the tax semi-elasticity. Since the data does not 
include wages, we model them using the product of employees and the average salary in 
each country, obtained from the International Labour Organization. Missing values in the 
average salary are estimated using a linear model containing log-GDP and log-Population  
(R 2 = 0.91). 
 
After estimating the tax semi-elasticities using equation 4, we calculate for each pair of 
countries (headquarter country and jurisdiction of operation) the underlying profits 
without profit shifting, ?̂?i . For this, we remove the effect of tax rates by comparing the 
profits reported in country i  with the profits in the hypothetical case that the country 
would have had an ETR of 25 per cent: 
 
  𝑝?̂? =  πi ⋅
eβ4(0.25i)+ β5log(t+0.25)
  eβ4(τi)+ β5log(t+τi)
                                                                                                 (5) 
 
 
This ETR threshold of 25 per cent corresponds roughly to a zero marginal effect of the ETR 
on profits in the quadratic and logarithmic models, as explored further in the results section. 
Since MNCs do not appear to shift profits towards countries with ETRs above 15 per cent, 
and our threshold is 25 per cent, ?̂?i   is almost always larger than πi . The results are robust to 
changes in this threshold. A threshold of 20 per cent reduces the estimate of profit shifting 
using the logarithmic model by 5 per cent, the estimate using the quadratic model by 18 per 
cent and the estimate using the linear model by 24 per cent. This is expected, since the vast 
majority of profits are shifted towards countries with extremely low tax rates, which the 
logarithmic models can account for. 
 
2.3 Reallocating shifted profits 
 
In this paper, we assume that the costs of profit shifting are largely fixed, and do not differ 
significantly with the size of financial flows. Once a tax-haven-based tax avoidance structure 
is in place (e.g. intellectual property located in a tax haven), we assume that the costs do not 
increase much with each additional dollar of profit shifted through it. Consequently, since 
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they constitute a small share of their overall costs, and are typically much lower than the tax 
avoided through profit shifting, these costs are minor for large MNCs (the only ones included 
in the CBCR data). By contrast, smaller companies may not find it worthwhile to set up such 
tax-haven-based tax avoidance structures at all. This dichotomy has been observed 
previously (Davies et al. 2018; Johannesen et al. 2020), and, indeed, large MNCs tend to be 
responsible for the bulk of profit shifting (Reynolds and Wier 2018). Profit shifting is 
calculated as the difference of the booked profits and the estimated profits, assuming that the 
cost of profit shifting is small: 
 
      
 
Since  ?̂?i  is almost always larger than πi , Si  does not correspond to profit shifted in or out of 
the country (i.e.  For this to happen, we need to redistribute shifted profits to 





where the change in profits due to profit shifting, ∆Pi , is defined as the profits shifted out of 
the country,   (we reverse its sign since   measures profits shifted into a country), plus 
the share of total profit shifted redistributed back to the country. 
 
We define the redistribution formula, Ri , operationalising real economic activity, as 
 
    
 
where 25 per cent of the weight is given to employees (Li ), 25 per cent to wages (Wi ) and 50 
per cent to unrelated party revenues (Revi). We use unrelated party revenues, which are less 
affected by tax-planning strategies than, for example, tangible assets. This is the same 
formula used by the misalignment model described in section 2.4. The reallocation of shifted 
profits to the jurisdictions where economic activity takes place is also used in the (OECD 
2020) BEPS plan in both pillar one (excess profit allocation) and pillar two (undertaxed 
payments rule), as well as by Beer et al. (2020b). In the sensitivity analysis, we test that our 
results are robust to changes in the redistribution formula. 
 
After the redistribution, the sum of the change in profits due to profit shifting, ∑∆Pi , 
sums to zero. 
 
Finally, tax revenue loss, TRLi  , is the product of the change in the profit base and the ETR 
(and we use the statutory rate as a robustness check): 
 
 TRLi = ∆Pi · ETRi (9) 
 
2.4 Misalignment model 
 
In addition to various semi-elasticity model specifications, we estimate the scale of profit 
shifting based on profit misalignment. The misalignment model applies basic arithmetic to the 
data to observe how well the location of reported profits are aligned with the location of 
economic activity, typically approximated by a combination of labour (measured using wages 
and employees), capital (often approximated with tangible assets) and revenue. Profit 
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misalignment is then calculated as the difference between reported profits (π) and estimated 
theoretical profits (?̂?). In our version of this method, and as in equation 8, we calculate  ?̂? 
giving 25 per cent of the weight to employees, 25 per cent of the weight to wages, and 50 per 
cent of the weight to unrelated party revenues (eq. 10). Since the majority of profits are 
shifted towards a small number of tax havens, the exact formula has little impact on the 
aggregated estimation of profit shifting, although can affect the results for individual countries 




Profit shifting is again calculated as the difference between booked profits and the estimated 
profits (eq. 6). In a pure misalignment model, the sum of profit shifting is equal to zero 
 We, however, add one extra constraint, similarly to OECD (2020). 
We set the profit misalignment of all foreign observations (pairs of reporting and investment 
countries where the reporting and investment countries are different) with a tax rate higher 
than 25 per cent to zero, since we assumed that an MNC would not shift profits to a country 
with a tax rate over 25 per cent. This corrects for extreme outliers, such as the high profits of 
Bermudian companies in Peru and high profits of MNCs in resource-rich countries compared 
with the economic activity in the countries. In order to ensure that ∑∆Pi = 0, we redistribute 
the profits as in section 2.1. 
 
 
3  Data 
 
Our paper exploits the CBCR dataset that became available in July 2020, and is of 
unprecedented quality. The dataset was created thanks to a CBCR regulation that stems 
from OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 13, and requires all large MNCs 
to report how much tax they pay in individual countries, including tax havens. The regulation 
impacts MNCs with consolidated annual group revenue of €750 million and above, 
headquartered in any country that has adopted the CBCR regulation. The firm-level data is 
collected by the headquarter country, aggregated by country of operations, and published by 
the OECD. The published data, which we use in this paper, is thus aggregated at the country 
level for each reporting country – for example, India publishes data on the operations of 
India-headquartered MNCs in Ghana, Switzerland and many other countries. 
 
To our knowledge, there are several research papers using CBCR data from the US 
(Clausing 2020b; Cobham et al. 2019; De Mooij et al. 2019; Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2021) and 
Germany (Fuest et al. 2021), and this is the first paper using the OECD CBCR data. 
 
We use the 2016 OECD CBCR data, which contains data for 26 headquarter countries (see 
Table B1). The 2017 CBCR data is expected to be released by the OECD in July 2021. 
Since reporting by US MNCs was voluntary in 2016, we replaced the 2016 data on US MNCs 
provided by the OECD with the 2017 data published by the US Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS). The US IRS has been publishing CBCR data 17 months before it is published by the 
OECD, which has allowed previous researchers to compare US CBCR with other sources 
(Clausing 2020b; Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2021), and established a good correlation between 
various types of data sources. Moreover, the CBCR data is outstanding in at least three 
dimensions. 
 
First, one of the most obvious advantages of CBCR data over other data sources is its much 
more substantial country coverage. This is especially relevant for lower-income countries and 
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for selected parts of the world, for which coverage from other data sources is notoriously 
limited (Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2021). For example, US CBCR data includes information on 
taxes and profits for US MNCs in 25 African countries, while the frequently used data from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United States Department of Commerce only covers 
3. CBCR data includes data on large MNCs’ profits and tax payments in, for example, up to 
141 (US) and 163 (India) jurisdictions in the full dataset. The exceptional data coverage of up 
to 195 countries enables us to estimate the scale of profit shifting for lower-income countries. 
This country coverage is one reason why UNODC and UNCTAD (2020) propose to use this 
CBCR data for the Sustainable Development Goals indicator of illicit financial flows, likely in 
a similar way that we implement the profit misalignment method outlined in Section 2.4. 
 
Second, CBCR ensures that profits and taxes are defined consistently with the concepts of 
corporate profits and taxes. By contrast, this is not the case with, for example, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis data, where profits are imputed from a combination of net profits, intra-
group dividends, interest paid and other variables, as recently discussed by Blouin and 
Robinson (2020), Clausing (2020a), Clausing (2020b), Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2021). 
Consequently, CBCR data excludes double-counting in revenue and likely in profit (with the 
exception of stateless entities dropped from our analysis and intercompany dividends, for 
which companies have neither instructions nor incentive to double-count). Since CBCR data 
offers the best available information on MNCs’ tax payments for many countries, it thus 
provides us with the first suitable dataset for a high-quality cross-country comparison – until 
now various proxies for profits were used, for example, by Haberly and Wójcik (2015), 
Bolwijn et al. (2018) or Damgaard et al. (2019). 
 
Third, CBCR data is provided in two separate datasets, for all subsidiaries (‘All Sub-Groups’), 
as well as for those subsidiaries that had positive profits and so not losses (‘Sub-Groups with 
Positive Profit’). While the data on affiliates with positive profits has lower coverage (Table 
B1), it allows for accurate estimates of the ETR. 
 
3.1 Use of data in the logarithmic and misalignment models 
 
We use different subsets of the data for different parts of the methodology. 
 
We estimate ETR as the ratio of accrued taxes over profits, using the data on ‘sub-groups 
with positive profits’. By using the data with positive profits only, we avoid offsetting firms with 
losses and firms with profits, and we can thus estimate ETRs more precisely. Since taxes are 
typically paid by companies earning profits, including companies making losses would 
overstate ETRs. We use ETRs in two parts of the paper: to calculate profit shifting in the 
semi-elasticity models, and to calculate tax revenue losses. For the semi-elasticity models 
we remove outliers – country dyads with tax rates above 50 per cent or smaller than 0 per 
cent. We also remove observations when reported profits are below US$1 billion. This 
eliminates outliers and allows for a more efficient estimation of the semi-elasticities. To 
calculate tax revenue losses we use the average ETR in the country, using the average ETR 
paid by foreign MNCs and the statutory tax rate as robustness checks. The average ETR is 
weighted by profits booked:  
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝜋𝑖
∑𝜋𝑖
 . For countries that are only available in the data on all 
sub-groups but not in the data on sub-groups with positive profit, we used the statutory 
corporate income tax rate.1 The ETRs are reported in Table B5. 
 
 
1  This was the case for Andorra, Armenia, Belize, Brunei, Central African Republic, Georgia, Gambia, Haiti, Kyrgyz 
Republic, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Moldova, North Macedonia, New Caledonia, North Korea, French Polynesia, 
Sudan, Togo, Chad, and Uzbekistan. 
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First, we estimate the semi-elasticity model (detailed in section 2.1) using data on ‘sub-
groups with positive profits’ for the 11 countries that reported data on at least 8 offshore 
financial centres (Figure 1).2 Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the CBCR data for the 
countries in this sample, distinguishing between domestic and foreign activities of MNCs –
domestic ones are those in the reporting (i.e. headquarter) countries, while foreign ones are 
those in all other countries (i.e. except for the domestic one). For most countries domestic 
profits and activities are higher than foreign ones. The exceptions are mainly Bermuda and 
Luxembourg, which are often considered tax havens, as well as Belgium. The observed 
balance between domestic and foreign activities provides useful guidance for when we 
estimate missing data in Section 3.2. 
 




Note. Countries (horizontal axis) reporting on large offshore financial centres (vertical axes) are depicted with black squares. 
 
 
Second, we reallocate profits shifted (equation 8) using the dataset including all sub-groups 
for the 27 countries that reported some information. Using the complete dataset allow us to 
more accurately measure information on real economic activities of MNCs regardless of 
whether the affiliates are profit- or loss-making. Since MNCs prefer to report losses in 
countries with high taxes while locating their profits in countries with low taxes, excluding 
loss-making affiliates would exclude an important component of profit shifting (see Figure A1 
for a visualisation of this behaviour in the CBCR data, and De Simone et al. (2017) for an 
empirical confirmation using tax returns data in the United Kingdom). The dataset on all sub-
groups is also more suitable for comparison with other datasets (e.g. from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis). 
 
Finally, and for the same reasons explained in the previous paragraph, we used data on all 
sub-groups for the misalignment model. The ETRs (used to calculate tax revenue losses) are 
still calculated from the data on sub-groups with positive profit. Since the misalignment 








Table 1 Summary statistics for the 11 countries of the sample used in the log-
model, for the data containing ‘Sub-Groups with positive profits’ 
 
  Firms Profits Tax accrued Tax paid Employees Revenue Assets ETR (%) ETR (%) 
Reporting Partner profits>0 US$bn US$bn US$bn Thousands US$bn US$bn accrued cash 
Australia Domestic 94 69.8 13.9 10.0 949.9 365.2 340.7 19.9% 14.3% 
 Foreign 758 26.5 3.1 2.7 335.3 124.2 92.9 11.6% 10.1% 
Belgium Domestic 43 18.7 1.0 0.8 146.0 88.4 90.8 5.4% 4.1% 
 Foreign 52 82.2 7.1 8.5 499.3 167.5 101.2 8.7% 10.3% 
Bermuda Domestic 26 12.7 0.0 0.0 2.1 10.4 9.1 0.2% 0.1% 
 Foreign 26 88.7 9.4 12.8 530.3 520.5 620.3 10.6% 14.5% 
China Domestic 77 391.8 65.5 77.9 11543.8 2785.2 5471.2 16.7% 19.9% 
 Foreign 905 57.3 5.3 5.2 355.6 376.7 336.1 9.2% 9.1% 
Denmark Domestic 35 17.0 2.4 2.5 120.5 44.7 24.0 13.9% 14.5% 
 Foreign 39 10.0 0.7 0.8 783.4 74.9 40.5 6.6% 7.7% 
India Domestic 146 74.8 18.4 22.2 3891.3 564.2 864.0 24.6% 29.7% 
 Foreign N/A 15.0 2.3 5.9 548.5 130.5 121.8 15.5% 39.6% 
Italy Domestic 104 48.3 6.6 7.4 630.5 340.7 209.1 13.6% 15.4% 
 Foreign 130 44.9 5.7 6.4 612.8 263.0 148.2 12.6% 14.3% 
Luxembourg Domestic 52 8.2 0.1 0.1 8.8 8.6 18.4 1.4% 0.9% 
 Foreign 119 34.3 2.4 2.8 1142.9 372.1 128.6 6.9% 8.1% 
Mexico Domestic 60 26.5 6.4 6.8 1228.6 139.3 100.6 23.9% 25.5% 
 Foreign 334 9.8 2.3 2.3 340.9 114.2 79.0 23.1% 23.4% 
United States Domestic 1094 1310.5 257.9 209.6 19601.7 9426.7 4880.5 19.7% 16.0% 
 Foreign 1548 873.6 102.5 100.5 10972.0 3338.4 1722.2 11.7% 11.5% 
South Africa Domestic 34 16.5 1.7 2.4 604.3 69.5 77.0 10.1% 14.6% 
 Foreign 574 5.2 1.2 0.9 316.9 43.7 41.1 23.8% 18.1% 
 
Note. The aggregated number of firms (‘Firms profits>0’), profits, tax accrued, tax paid, number of employees, unrelated-
party revenue, tangible assets and ETRs (accrued and cash-based) are shown for domestic activities (financial reporting 
of MNCs in the reporting (i.e. headquarter countries) and foreign activities (financial reporting in all other countries). Since 
we are using sub-groups with positive profits, the number of firms included in the domestic section can be lower than the 
number of firms reporting on foreign operations. Non-available data is marked with N/A. 
 
3.2 Data limitations and corrections: imputing missing data 
 
While the substantial country coverage, as well as the other advantages of CBCR data, open 
new avenues for research, several challenges associated with the new data source remain 
(we summarise them and the above-discussed advantages in Table 2). First, a certain extent 
of double counting in profit due to intercompany dividends is inevitable – MNCs are 
instructed not to double count intercompany dividends in revenue, but not instructed to do so 
explicitly in profit. Some countries (e.g. the Netherlands and Sweden) have published 
associated notes together with their data, showing that domestic operations of MNCs may be 
considerably affected by this. This potential double counting is one consequence of CBCR 
data being based on financial accounting rather than tax accounting, a limitation shared with 
most other data sources. However, the potential double counting is expected to have a 
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limited effect – since we exclude income of stateless entities,3 which might account for 38 per 
cent of the potential double counting for US MNCs (Horst and Curatolo 2020); since using 
financial accounting has been found to underestimate profit shifting (Bilicka 2019); and since 
the US CBCR data produces totals reassuringly consistent with other data sources (Clausing 
2020b; Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2021). Moreover, there do not seem to be incentives for 
double counting profits in tax havens, since MNCs know that this data is used for assessing 
transfer pricing risk. 
 




Includes data on large MNCs’ profits and tax payments in around 100 jurisdictions for at least 5 headquarter countries. 
Does not include double counting in revenue and limited in profit. 




Might include some double counting in profit due to intercompany dividends or stateless entities (which we drop). 
Includes a sample of large MNCs for 2016 for some countries in aggregated and anonymised form (which we address). 
 
 
Second, while the availability of CBCR data constitutes a significant step forward, and 
partially corrects this issue, the data is still not complete and is not systematically 
disaggregated by jurisdiction. The CBCR regulation has been implemented by approximately 
100 countries so far – only 26 of them agreed to share their data publicly in aggregated and 
anonymised form; moreover, some have chosen to aggregate data to a far greater extent 
than others (Figure 1). Of the 137 jurisdictions included in the Inclusive Framework on BEPS, 
58 jurisdictions agreed on collecting CBCR, 35 received data from 20+ MNCs, 26 
jurisdictions shared a limited amount of data, and only 10 jurisdictions disaggregated the 
data on more than 60 countries, with the US and India (137 and 163 jurisdictions, 
respectively) leading the way (Table B1). In the remainder of this section, we deal empirically 
with three issues related to data completeness: the lack of completeness in the data of 
reporting countries; the varying combinations of countries in the aggregated country 
categories; and the lack of reporting by some countries. Other limitations of the CBCR data 
(e.g. revenue unavailable according to the location of the final customer) are discussed by 
the OECD, which published the data with an ‘Important disclaimer regarding the limitations of 
the country-by-country report statistics’, and by Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2021) and Clausing 
(2020b). 
 
The first limitation concerns the lack of completeness in the data of reporting countries. We 
address this limitation by comparing the number of companies in Orbis, a frequently used 
database covering over 300 million public and private firms worldwide, with the number of 
companies observed in CBCR (Table B2). Orbis has good coverage regarding the number 
and consolidated revenue of large MNCs (Garcia-Bernardo and Takes 2018), but poor 
information at the subsidiary level (Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2021; Phillips et al. 2020). While 
the number of companies observed and expected are similar for most countries, we observe 
large differences in the case of some countries. We therefore multiplied all reported financial 
information by a ratio listed in Table B2 in case that ratio was above one, with the exception 
of two countries – the US and China. In the case of the US, we expected 1,501 companies 
according to Orbis. Instead, we find 1,101 companies in the 2016 data. This is due to a lack 
 
3  Stateless entities include not only entities whose stateless status results from a mismatch between the legislation of two 
jurisdictions (e.g. the case of Apple Sales International in Ireland), but also includes flow-through entity (tax-transparent 
entities). The latter are not considered separate legal entities from their owners, and whose profits are taxed at the level 
of the owner. 
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of completeness of 2016 data in the US (Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2021). US IRS data for 2017 
indicates that we should observe approximately 1,575 companies –1,548 with profits in at 
least one jurisdiction. In order to correct for this disparity we use US data for 2017 (the US is 
the only country that has published data for 2017). In China, instead of the expected 583, 
only 82 companies reported satisfactory data to the OECD. However, those 82 companies 
reported US$2.9 trillion of sales domestically, and US$0.45 trillion abroad; for comparison, 
the numbers for the US in 2016 were US$7.8 trillion domestically and US$3.4 trillion abroad. 
This indicates that the data is not as erratic as it may appear. Lacking a better heuristic, we 
multiply the financial information for China by a conservative factor of two, and run 
robustness tests to assess the impact of our correction (Section 4.4). 
 
The second limitation concerns the combination of countries in aggregated categories – for 
example, Chile and the British Virgin Islands may be grouped together in ‘Other Americas’. 
The aggregation criterion is different for different countries. While India and South Africa do 
not seem to aggregate data, the US aggregates countries with a low number of reporting 
MNCs. This is problematic, as aggregation affects particularly lower-income countries and 
low tax jurisdictions. For instance, only three countries report information on Zambia, and 
only two countries report on the Isle of Man. The other countries aggregate information on 
Zambia and the Isle of Man in larger categories such as Other Africa and Other Europe. If we 
decided to ignore this grouped data, we would be missing a significant part of the operations 
in those countries, leading to an underestimation of the extent of profit shifting. This is 
acknowledged by the Economic Analysis and Impact Assessment of the OECD (OECD 
2020), who impute missing sales by extrapolating using a gravity model using data available 
in the CBCR, Orbis, and the OECD’s Activity of Multinational Enterprises database, as well 
as foreign direct investment and GDP data. 
 
We address these biases by modelling the location of employees and sales for each pair of 
countries using a Histogram-based Gradient Boosting Regression Tree, a type of gradient 
boosting based on decision trees that frequently outperforms other machine learning 
algorithms, while offering some interpretability on the most relevant features (Friedman 2001; 
Ke et al. 2017). Specifically, we use the Python implementation in scikit-learn (Pedregosa et 
al. 2011). Another of its advantages is that it offers native support for missing values, and as 
such is able to use a large range of features without data imputation. We train the location of 
profits, employees, sales and tangible assets using variables from the gravity dataset of 
CEPII, imports and exports from UN Comtrade, and foreign direct investment from the World 
Bank, as well as from other sources detailed in Table E1 in Appendix E. We obtain a mean 
out-of-sample R-square of 0.59, 0.45, 0.47 and 0.39 respectively for employees, sales, 
profits and tangible assets. 
 
We use the model to estimate the total number of employees, unrelated party sales and 
tangible assets for each pair of countries in the world. For reporting countries, we then adjust 
the estimated values so their sum corresponds to the aggregated sum in CBCR. We 
demonstrate our approach using the following model scenario: French MNCs have 10,000 
employees in Other America, and Other America comprises Paraguay and Suriname – we 
can establish this by checking which countries are missing from the CBCR data of France. If 
our model estimates 6,000 employees in Paraguay and 5,000 employees in Suriname, we 
multiply the employees of those countries by 10,000 and divide by 11,000. In the next step, 
we compare for each country the sums of those estimated values with the sums of the values 
observed in the CBCR data. We then use the lowest of the two ratios (estimated vs. reported 
employees and sales) to adjust the profits shifted in order to correct for the combination of 
small countries in aggregated groups. We cap this ratio at 10 – that is, if the model expects 
that the OECD data is less than 10 per cent complete, we consider it to be 10 per cent 
complete. While the estimation of missing economic activity increases total shifted profits by 
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approximately 30 per cent, it is key with respect to accounting for missing data in countries 
underrepresented in the sample – typically lower-income countries. Without this step, we 
would redistribute too few profits to those countries. Figure A4 shows the available 
information on CBCR, displaying how data coverage is especially worrisome in the case of 
lower-income countries. 
 
The third limitation concerns the lack of reporting by some countries, including Germany, 
Spain and the UK, which excludes MNCs headquartered in those countries from the sample 
– but we do have the operations in those countries of MNCs headquartered in reporting 
countries. This limitation is partially addressed in the previous step, where financial 
information for all pairs of countries is estimated, even for non-reporting countries. However, 
the information on domestic activities of MNCs is important, especially for large countries. 
This is addressed by estimating the number of domestic employees and revenue for all non-
reporting countries. We do so by using a linear model based on the number of expected 
companies in each country, its GDP, population, the average ETRs and the total 
consolidated banking claims on an immediate counterparty basis (Table B4 of the BIS data) 
(R-square 0.97, 0.98 respectively for employees and sales; see also Figures A6 and A7). 
 
Importantly, in the logarithmic model, we only use the fixes to the second and third limitations 
to redistribute profits back to the home countries, but not to calculate profit shifted. We do 
this since we do not have accurate estimates of ETR for MNCs of non-reporting countries. 
Instead, we divide the total profit shifted by the share of GDP of the countries of the sample 
(49%). This is a similar figure to the available economic activity estimated in the CBCR data 
using the fixes to the second and third limitation (45%). Using the GDP in the logarithmic 
model may be a conservative strategy, since we are assuming that the MNCs of non-
reporting countries (the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands and Ireland) are similar to 
those of reporting countries. 
 
Finally, we assess our results’ sensitivity to the estimation of missing information. To do so, 
we train the models 1,000 times using bootstrapped samples of the data (i.e. the gradient 
boosting ensemble to address the second limitation and the linear regression to address the 
third limitation) and record the impact in our results. Since the sampling randomly removes 
information, samples without important dyads (e.g. USA-Netherlands, or China-Hong Kong) 
will be more affected. This thus offers a conservative strategy that allows us to partially 
understand how our results depend on methodological choices. In the end, we use median 
values as our preferred point estimates. 
 
The difference between the observed and estimated location of employees and sales is 
visualised in Figure A5. In comparison with the observed location of the economy, the 
estimated location is more balanced, giving less weight to reporting countries, and affecting 
especially Asian and African countries – see the largest outliers in Figure A5A. Our estimated 
location of the economy matches closely the share of GDP for richer countries, while departs 
for developing countries (Figure A5B). This is expected given the lower presence of large 
MNCs in developing countries. 
 
 
4  Results 
 
The results section is composed of four parts. In the first part we demonstrate the advantage 
of our methodology using the 2017 US CBCR data. In the second part we apply our 
methodology to the 2016 OECD CBCR data, and compare it to estimates generated using 
other methodologies. In the third part we test whether the scales of profit shifting and 
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associated tax revenue loss are higher or lower in some country groups. In the fourth part, 
we present a series of robustness tests and sensitivity analyses. 
 
4.1 Estimation of profit shifting (2017 US data): the logarithmic model versus 
other models 
 
We first test our methodology using only 2017 US CBCR data. Restricting our analysis to US 
data allows us to compare with previous analysis, including one of the best-regarded papers 
on profit shifting using tax semi-elasticities, Dowd et al. (2017). The results of our regressions 
(Table 3) shows that the logarithmic model fits the data better than any other model. This not 
only involves a higher R-square and lower Bayesian information criteria, but also a better 
disaggregation of the origin and destination of profits shifted. Figure 2 shows a graphical 
interpretation of the coefficients. The logarithmic model is capable of accounting for extreme 
ratios of profit shifted in small countries with low ETRs, while at the same time avoiding the 
overestimation of profit shifted in countries with tax rates between 15-25 per cent. 
Empirically, the misalignment strategy shows that profit is not misaligned with economic 
activity in those countries. However, the quadratic model assumes that 18-43 per cent of 
profits in those countries have been shifted in. By contrast, the logarithmic model assumes 
that only 5-19 per cent have been (Table 4).4 Importantly, the logarithmic model and the 
misalignment model clearly identify that the majority of profits in small countries with 
extremely low tax rates are shifted there. This effect is less pronounced for the quadratic 
model, and especially so for the linear model (Table 4). For an ETR of 1.5 per cent (e.g. 
Bermuda), the logarithmic and quadratic model estimates that 94 per cent and 90 per cent of 
the booked profits have been shifted into the country, while the linear model estimates that 
only 61 per cent have. 
 
The estimates of tax semi-elasticity from Dowd et al. (2017) (hereinafter referred to as DLM) 
are considered to be one of the best currently available (e.g. Clausing 2020b). However, 
using these semi-elasticities to estimate profit shifted at the country level shows that DLM are 
likely to underestimate profit shifting by up to 80 per cent in tax havens. The elasticities 
reported by DLM imply that merely 23-38 per cent of the profits booked in Cayman Islands 
have been shifted there (Table 3), while both the quadratic and logarithmic models estimate 
that over 90 per cent of the profits have been shifted there. This corresponds extremely well 
with the misalignment strategy: US MNCs book 2.86 per cent of their profits in the Cayman 
Islands, but only 0.06 per cent of their estimated economic activity is in fact carried out there, 





4  Note that for countries with a tax rate above 15%, even when the estimated profits shifted are 20% of the total profits, 




Table 3 Comparison of semi-elasticities for the logarithmic (Log), quadratic 
(Quad) and linear (Linear) models 
 Log Quad Log+Quad Linear DLM-Quad DLM-Linear 
Intercept -6.8326*** -0.8160 -7.3478*** -0.8683  2.482 
 (2.0061) (2.1996) (2.1783) (2.4403)  (0.136) 
ETR 5.5093*** -17.2618*** 8.5732 -4.0226*** -3.748 -1.076 
 (1.4594) (3.0732) (5.1545) (1.0793)  (0.108) 
log(0.0014 + ETR) -1.5176***  -1.6464***    
 (0.1920)  (0.2834)    
ETR2  28.5306*** -4.8589  7.184  
  (6.2822) (7.8373)    
log(Population) 0.3694*** 0.2885** 0.3671*** 0.1807   
 (0.1051) (0.1235) (0.1056) (0.1344)   
log(GDPpc) 0.4721*** 0.4953** 0.4698*** 0.4917**   
 (0.1628) (0.1926) (0.1634) (0.2137)   
log(Tangible Assets) 0.4874*** 0.6354*** 0.4841*** 0.7436***   
 (0.0748) (0.0832) (0.0753) (0.0885)   
log(Wages) 0.1617* 0.0291 0.1648* -0.0670   
 (0.0929) (0.1066) (0.0934) (0.1159)   
N 91 91 91 91 96,959 96,959 
R2 0.90 0.86 0.90 0.82 0.465 0.465 
 222.58 253.21 226.67 268.68   
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 ETR ETR 
Notes. (A, B) Marginal effect of ETR on profits. (C,D) Relative increase in profits due to profit shifting, compared with a country 
with an ETR of 25%. Plots B and D are close-ups of plots A and C respectively, constraining ETRs between 5 and 50%. Note 
that the marginal effects for the logarithmic model decreases faster than other models as the ETR approaches 0%. 
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The main reason why the estimated semi-elasticities of DLM are three times below the ones 
estimated by us is likely the difference in the aggregation level and type of model used by 
DLM (firm-level and within model) and us (country-level and between model). While firm-level 
data is generally preferred, it is rarely available with characteristics comparable to the CBCR 
data (and almost invariantly only for individual countries and in collaboration with tax 
administrations, such as in the case of DLM), and may lead to an underestimation of the 
scale of profit shifting if a within model is used. A between-country estimation exploits 
differences across countries, implicitly reflecting all historical developments up until today. In 
contrast, a within-firm or within-country approach ignores profit shifting taking place at the 
beginning of the studied time period. In our opinion, a within-between model (first proposed 
by Mundlak 1978) would be preferred to analyse profit shifting, since it can simultaneously 
model the within and between effects, and as such model both the potential effects of 
changes in tax rates, and the scale of profit shifting. Our data is more similar to that of Hines 
and Rice (1994) and Clausing (2016), which estimate a constant tax semi-elasticity in the 
range of 6-13 and 2-5 respectively – both of which are among the studies with higher values 
of estimated semi-elasticities, as reviewed by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) and Beer et 
al. (2020a). 
 
Figure 2 shows a U-shaped relationship in the effect of ETRs on profits. The semi-elasticity is 
negative until the ETR reaches approximately 25 per cent, thereafter becoming positive. This 
is due to high profits in countries rich in natural resources, such as Angola, the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Norway and Nigeria. These countries levy resource taxes while carrying out 
activities that produce vast amounts of profit in relation to the labour and capital costs. In 
order to correct for this in our estimates of profit shifting, we assume a tax semi-elasticity of 
zero if the ETR is higher than 25 per cent. This approach is also used in the Impact 
Assessment of the BEPS plan (OECD 2020). 
 
Next, we redistribute the profits shifted according to equation 8 to calculate global profit 
shifting. The logarithmic model yields an estimate of US$365 billion of profit shifted, 
comparable to the US$304 billion of profit shifted found by the misalignment strategy (Figure 
3).5 The destination of shifted profits is similar between models (Figure 3 and A3). The 
majority of these profits are in a small group of tax havens. The large majority of profits 
shifted, are shifted to the top 10 countries shown in Table 4. Moreover, over 75 per cent of 
the profits booked in those 10 countries are artificially shifted there. The Cayman Islands, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Singapore, Bermuda and Puerto Rico are the 
largest destinations. However, several differences may be observed. Profit shifted to 
Luxembourg is three times larger in the logarithmic model. This is due to the presence of 
many companies with losses. Compared with the US$24 billion of profits found in 
Luxembourg in the data on ‘All Sub-Groups’ (used for the misalignment model), we found 
US$60 billion of profits in the data on ‘Sub-Groups with positive profits’. Similarly, while the 
‘Other Europe’, ‘Other Asia&Oceania’ and ‘Other America’ groups appear as profit 
destinations in the logarithmic model, they appear as places of profit origin in the 
misalignment. This is due to the higher granularity of the data with ‘All Sub-Groups’ used for 
the misalignment model. There, ‘Isle of Man’, ‘Barbados’, ‘Gibraltar’, ‘Macao’ and ‘the British 




5  Since our objective in this section is to compare the different methodologies and not to present the scale of profit shifted 
for individual countries, we do not try to disaggregate categories (e.g. ‘Other Europe’) into individual countries, as 
detailed in section 3.2 and as applied in section 4.2. 
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Figure 3 Profits shifted in and out of countries using 2017 US data, estimated with the 
misalignment, logarithmic (Log), quadratic (Quad), linear (Linear) and DLM (Linear-
DLM, Quad-DLM) models 
 
Note. MNCs shift profits from countries with negative shifted profits to countries with positive shifted profits. The largest origins 
of the profits are visualised in blue, and the largest destinations in red. All other countries are visualised together in grey. The 
annotations indicate the percentage of profit shifted out of the country (compared to estimated profits) or into the country 
(compared to booked profits). 
 
Table 4 Percentage of profits shifted into countries with lowest ETRs (weighted by 
profits), for misalignment (Misal.), logarithmic (log), quadratic (Quad), linear (Linear) 
and the DLM models 




Jersey 0.1% $14.2 bn $11.7 bn 96.1% 99.6% 91.9% 63.2% 38.3% 23.5% 
Cayman Islands 0.5% $62.4 bn $58.5 bn 98.3% 98.5% 91.3% 62.7% 37.5% 23.2% 
Other Europe 0.7% $14.4 bn $0.0 bn - 97.7% 91.0% 62.3% 36.9% 23.0% 
Luxembourg 0.9% $60.4 bn $24.9 bn 88.5% 97.0% 90.7% 62.1% 36.5% 22.8% 
Puerto Rico 1.4% $35.2 bn $34.3 bn 92.8% 94.5% 89.9% 61.2% 35.3% 22.4% 
Bermuda 1.5% $35.4 bn $32.5 bn 97.8% 94.3% 89.8% 61.2% 35.2% 22.4% 
Other America 2.3% $12.8 bn $-0.1 bn - 89.9% 88.4% 59.9% 33.4% 21.7% 
Singapore 4.5% $56.8 bn $54.6 bn 69.0% 76.1% 83.7% 56.1% 28.4% 19.8% 
Switzerland 5.5% $59.2 bn $49.4 bn 70.5% 69.8% 81.2% 54.4% 26.2% 18.9% 
Netherlands 6.8% $70.0 bn $40.0 bn 71.3% 61.4% 77.5% 51.9% 23.4% 17.8% 
Hong Kong 11.1% $13.6 bn $12.3 bn 25.7% 36.7% 62.1% 42.9% 14.9% 13.9% 
United Kingdom 11.6% $81.7 bn $18.1 bn - 33.9% 59.7% 41.6% 13.9% 13.4% 
Ireland 12.4% $34.2 bn $29.5 bn 34.6% 30.3% 56.4% 39.7% 12.5% 12.7% 
Canada 15.2% $40.1 bn $31.7 bn - 18.8% 43.1% 32.5% 8.0% 10.0% 
Australia 15.3% $18.1 bn $14.8 bn - 18.5% 42.7% 32.3% 7.9% 9.9% 
United States 19.7% $1310.5 bn $1180.0 bn - 6.6% 21.4% 19.3% 2.8% 5.6% 
Japan 20.5% $25.5 bn $24.9 bn 11.6% 5.0% 17.5% 16.5% 2.1% 4.7% 
China 23.0% $28.5 bn $26.8 bn - 1.5% 6.9% 7.7% 0.6% 2.1% 
Germany 24.9% $19.8 bn $6.8 bn - 0.1% 0.4% 0.5% - 0.1% 
Brazil 25.5% $12.0 bn $5.9 bn - - - - - - 
Mexico 26.7% $17.7 bn $15.6 bn - - - - - - 
India 33.0% $13.7 bn $11.8 bn - 2.1% - - 3.3% - 
Note. Only countries with at least US$10 billion in profits booked are shown. The column ‘profits (+)’ indicates the profits of 
affiliates with positive profits, the column ‘profits (all)’ indicates the profits of all affiliates. Only positive values of profit 
shifting are displayed. 
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The origin of shifted profits is, however, considerably different across the models – 72 per 
cent of the employees, wages and sales of US MNCs are located in the US. Since the ETR 
of the US is 20 per cent, this implies that no profits are shifted into the US, and approximately 
72 per cent of the global shifted profits are redistributed back to the US in the models relying 
on semi-elasticity. In the misalignment model a lower fraction of the profits is redistributed to 
the US, since 65 per cent of the profits are already reported in the US – the misalignment 
between profits and economic activity is small. However, some of the 65 per cent of profits 
may have been reported in the US due to the double-counting discussed in Section 2. If this 
is the case, then the real misalignment for the US would be larger. In addition to the US, the 
UK also seems to lose out in the misalignment model, but not in the other models (Figure 3). 
In the tax semi-elasticity models, the low ETR of the UK (12%) implies that profits are 
expected to be shifted into the country. In the misalignment model profits are found to be 
shifted out of the country, since the profits reported in the UK (1.0% of the total) are lower 
than their share of the economy (3.2% of the total). The low aggregated profits recorded in 
the UK are a consequence of MNCs reporting zero or negative profits (Bilicka 2019). 
 
Overall, while we consider the logarithmic specification to be more accurate with respect to 
estimating the global scale of profit shifting, the misalignment method might provide more 
accurate estimates of the redistribution of these shifted profits. The misalignment method 
takes into consideration the current distribution of profits, and in this respect provides a more 
accurate way of redistributing profits. The location of profits and economic activity is often 
more balanced (i.e. less misaligned) in countries with high per capita income (Figure A3 in 
the Appendix). The logarithmic model is agnostic to this fact, and redistributes the profits only 
as a function of the location of economic activity. As a consequence, the misalignment model 
typically redistributes more profits back to lower-income countries. 
 
How the redistribution of shifted profits works differently in the two methods is best illustrated 
using a simple example. Assume that US$9 million profits are located in the US, US$0 
million are located in India and US$1 million are located in the Cayman Islands. In contrast, 
the wages and sales in the US add up to US$9 million, US$1 million in India and in US$0 
million in the Cayman Islands. Both the logarithmic and the misalignment models would find 
that the shifted profit or the total misalignment is approximately US$1 million (located in the 
Cayman Islands), but the redistribution would differ. The logarithmic model would redistribute 
90 per cent of those shifted profits to the US and 10 per cent to India. Since the profits in the 
US are comparable to the economic activity, the misalignment model would redistribute 0 per 
cent of those profits to the US and 100 per cent to India. Since the misalignment model takes 
into consideration the degree of profit shifting out of a country – as our example illustrates – 
the redistribution of profits is more accurate and realistic under the misalignment model than 
under the logarithmic specification. 
 
4.2 Estimation of profit shifting (2016 OECD data) 
 
Having shown that the logarithmic model is superior to both the quadratic and linear models, 
we apply it to the 2016 OECD CBCR data, complemented by 2017 US data (Section 2.1). 
We use the same methodology as in the previous section, but add fixed effects for the 
reporting countries to correct for differences in profitability due to the location of 
headquarters, and add an interaction between the reporting country and either log(t + ETR), 
ETR 2 or ETR in our logarithmic, quadratic and linear models. 
 
Table 5 shows the estimates of tax semi-elasticity using the OECD data (with an 
interpretation of the coefficients given visually in Figure A8). The US is used as the reference 
group for country comparisons. We again observe that the logarithmic model fits the data 
better than the quadratic and linear specifications. The logarithmic model estimates that over 
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40 per cent of profit shifting takes places towards countries with an ETR below 1 per cent 
(Table 6). The quadratic and linear models are not able to capture this fully, while at the 
same time estimating that over 24 per cent of profit shifting takes place to countries with ETR 
above 15 per cent (Table 6). The misalignment model yields similar results to the logarithmic 
model, reinforcing the accuracy of the logarithmic model. 
 
The location of MNCs’ headquarters has been shown both theoretically and empirically to be 
an important consideration in the profit shifting carried out by MNCs (Dischinger et al. 2014). 
A significant number of existing studies observed profit shifting in the case of US-
headquartered MNCs (Clausing 2020b; Dowd et al. 2017; Guvenen et al. 2017). Moreover, 
previous research has suggested – although, to the best of our knowledge, not empirically 
confirmed – that US MNCs are more aggressive than other MNCs with respect to their tax 
planning strategies. For example, the ETR paid on foreign profits by US MNCs in sectors 
other than oil has fallen by half since the late 1990s, and nearly half of this decline is 
estimated to be the outcome of the rise of profit shifting to tax havens (Wright and Zucman 
2018). 
 
The introduction of the interaction term between the country fixed-effect and log(ETR), ETR 2 
or ETR allows us to understand the aggressiveness of each country’s MNCs with respect to 
profit shifting. We find that US MNCs are the most aggressive (the magnitude of the 
interaction is more negative), and that the difference is statistically significant for all countries 
with the exception of Belgium, Bermuda and Luxembourg (Table 5). In fact, the relationship 
completely disappears for South Africa, Mexico, China and India (Figure A10). Japan would 
be an interesting case to study due to its historically perceived distinct attitude towards tax 
planning (Izawa 2019). However, the CBCR data reported by Japan only disaggregated in 12 
jurisdictions, which prevents us from accurately estimating profit shifting by MNCs 
headquartered in Japan. We thus expect that even more comprehensive data should provide 
us with a more definitive international comparison in the future. The US stands out among 
those headquarter countries that report data of sufficient quality, but also among those 
headquarter countries that are more aggressive at shifting profits to tax havens. 
 
Next, we calculate the extent of profit shifting for all models and compare it with the two DLM 
specifications and with the misalignment model. We reach an estimate of US$965 billion 
shifted for the logarithmic model and a 95 per cent confidence interval of US$889–1,174 
billion for the misalignment model, of which we use the median, US$994 billion (Table 7 and 
Figure 4).We compare the results obtained using both methodologies in Figure A9 in the 
Appendix. In general, there is a good correlation between the origin and the destination of 
profit shifted, albeit with some outliers (Japan, the UK, Luxembourg and Belgium), with 
Luxembourg and the UK previously discussed in Section 4.1. Our total estimates are broadly 
comparable to or somewhat higher than existing estimates such as Tørsløv et al. (2020), 
who estimate profit shifting to be over US$600 billion in 2015, albeit using a smaller sample 
of countries (a comparison of our and their estimates is in Figure D1). Our findings imply that 
revenue losses total approximately US$200-300 billion. This is comparable with recent 
leading estimates of revenue losses that range from US$100 to US$600 billion, as reviewed 
by Cobham and Janský (2020). Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that some 
aspects of our methodological approach are conservative. For example, we aggregate at the 
country level and as such offset profits shifted in with profits shifted out. The estimated scale 







Table 5 Regression table for the CBCR data 
 Logarithmic Quadratic Log*FE + Quad Log + Quad*FE Linear 
ETR 0.8875 -8.5032*** 1.9793 0.0754 -3.6634*** 
 (0.7719) (1.6584) (2.5847) (2.6843) (1.2751) 
ETR2  11.9405*** -2.1320 -1.6397  
  (4.2511) (4.8163) (5.3813)  
log(0.0007 + ETR) -0.8665***  -0.8957*** -0.3379***  
 (0.1642)  (0.1770) (0.0838)  
Australia*tax 0.4306** 1.0065 0.4330** -0.7650 -0.3838 
 (0.1998) (7.8104) (0.2000) (7.7249) (2.6301) 
Belgium*tax 0.2948 -4.5105 0.3008* -4.2598 -1.7723 
 (0.1790) (4.5443) (0.1796) (4.4877) (1.9625) 
Bermuda*tax 0.0943 -3.5274 0.0956 -3.8274 -0.9763 
 (0.2169) (4.2640) (0.2171) (4.2111) (1.9457) 
China*tax 0.8757*** 13.2458** 0.8777*** 12.5428** 5.5597** 
 (0.1945) (5.4004) (0.1947) (5.3355) (2.1749) 
Denmark*tax 0.3397** -3.7208 0.3466** -2.7414 -1.8929 
 (0.1615) (3.8300) (0.1623) (3.7897) (1.6508) 
India*tax 0.7779*** 8.0289 0.7821*** 8.1251* 4.2697** 
 (0.1947) (4.9194) (0.1950) (4.8578) (2.1596) 
Italy*tax 0.6494*** 6.1330 0.6505*** 4.8425 1.4175 
 (0.1857) (6.4195) (0.1858) (6.3470) (2.2274) 
Luxembourg*tax 0.2824 5.0685 0.2859 4.3634 -0.0267 
 (0.1837) (5.2002) (0.1840) (5.1380) (2.0815) 
Mexico*tax 0.9279*** 9.8344** 0.9364*** 10.2409** 5.5226*** 
 (0.1825) (4.1190) (0.1837) (4.0686) (1.8670) 
South Africa*tax 0.9362*** 9.7287** 0.9404*** 10.1278** 5.4227*** 
 (0.1829) (4.1038) (0.1840) (4.0486) (1.8683) 
log(Population) 0.0990** 0.0641 0.0978** 0.0789** 0.0334 
 (0.0387) (0.0397) (0.0388) (0.0394) (0.0390) 
log(GDPpc) 0.1027* 0.1262** 0.1024* 0.1206** 0.1238** 
 (0.0573) (0.0597) (0.0574) (0.0590) (0.0599) 
log(Tangible assets) 0.3251*** 0.3136*** 0.3254*** 0.3167*** 0.3183*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0243) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0246) 
log(Wages) 0.2440*** 0.2198*** 0.2442*** 0.2352*** 0.2172*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0344) (0.0334) (0.0341) (0.0344) 
FE interaction log quad log quad lin 
N 622 622 622 622 622 
R2 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.71 
BIC 2220.79 2270.04 2227.02 2259.72 2268.14 
Note. Country-tax represents the interaction effect between the country and log (0.0007 + ETR), ETR2 and ETR for our three 
specifications (logarithmic, quadratic and linear). The intercept and country fixed effects are not shown and are generally 
negative and significant at the 0.1% significance level; since the treatment group is the US, this indicates the higher 
profitability of US MNCs. Significance level: p<0.05 (*), p<0.01 (**), p<0.001 (***). 
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Table 6 Share of profit shifted into countries, grouped by the ETR 
ETR Misalignment Logarithmic Quadratic Linear 
<1% 40.0% 41.6% 31.0% 30.1% 
1-5 17.5% 21.6% 17.8% 16.2% 
5-10% 24.9% 27.8% 24.3% 23.6% 
10-15% 3.5% 2.9% 2.7% 2.5% 
15-25% 13.7% 6.1% 24.2% 27.6% 
>25 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Note. The quadratic and linear models are not able to account for the large share of profits shifted into countries with ETRs 
below 1%. 
 
Table 7 Estimates of profits shifted and tax revenue loss (TRL) for the misalignment 
and logarithmic models 
 Profits shifted TRL (total ETR) TLR (foreign ETR) TRL (CIT) 
Misalignment $994 bn $205 bn $214 bn $307 bn 
Logarithmic $965 bn $186 bn $200 bn $300 bn 
Notes. Three different tax rates are used, the total ETR (both domestic and foreign MNCs), the foreign ETR (only foreign 
MNCs), and the statutory tax rate (CIT). 
 
In addition to outlining the overall scale of the practice, Figure 4 provides an overview of the 
origins and destinations of profit shifting. Using both the logarithmic model and misalignment 
methods, we estimate that the Cayman Islands and the Netherlands have 94-99 per cent and 
45-65 per cent of their respective booked profits shifted in from other countries, while also 
ranking among countries most benefiting from profit shifting in absolute terms. The US and 
Japan are estimated to suffer the most from profit shifting in absolute terms according to 
most of the methods, while Germany and France are affected to a substantially greater 
degree relative to estimated profits (66-67% for both using the logarithmic model and 45% for 
Germany and 24% for France using the misalignment method). Table 8 shows the largest 
destinations of profit shifting. Tables B3-B4 and Figure A9 in the Appendix show profit 
shifting at the country level for all countries (we present estimates for 192 countries in total), 





Figure 4 Profits shifted in and out of countries using the CBCR data, estimated with 
the misalignment, logarithmic (Log), quadratic (Quad), linear (Linear) and DLM (Linear-
DLM, Quad-DLM) models 
 
 
Note. MNCs shift profits from countries with negative shifted profits to countries with positive shifted profits. The largest origins 
of the profits are visualised in blue, and the largest destinations in red. All other countries are visualised together in grey. The 
annotations indicate the percentage of profit shifted out of the country (compared to estimated profits) or into the country 
(compared to booked profits). 
 
Table 8 Top 7 destinations of profit shifting (PS (B)) for misalignment and logarithmic 
models and as a percentage of the total profits booked in the jurisdiction (PS (% 
booked)) 
 Misalignment  Logarithmic   
Country P (all groups) PS (B) PS (%booked) P (groups>0) PS (B) PS (%booked) 
Cayman Islands 148,968 147,879 99.27 136,653 128,895 94.32 
Netherlands 212,366 140,896 66.35 166,854 75,624 45.32 
China 1,000,565 94,385 9.43 1,746,828 50,073 2.87 
Hong Kong 160,805 90,199 56.09 185,760 94,270 50.75 
Bermuda 63,542 62,992 99.13 113,955 101,749 89.29 
British Virgin Islands 60,895 60,895 100.00 81,794 78,354 95.79 
Switzerland 129,518 51,611 39.85 127,879 61,244 47.89 
Puerto Rico 44,639 42,565 95.35 72,012 63,336 87.95 
Ireland 65,106 28,062 43.10 76,753 18,496 24.10 
Singapore 111,477 22,850 20.50 129,768 63,969 49.30 
Luxembourg 28,228 17,536 62.12 146,916 119,057 81.04 
Note. The total profits for all groups ((P (all groups)) and groups with positive profits (P (groups>0) are shown for comparison. 
Puerto Rico, Ireland and Luxembourg are not part of the top seven jurisdictions, but are included to provide context. The full 






4.3 Profit shifting and tax revenue loss by income groups 
 
The analysis presented above compares different methodology approaches and establishes 
the largest origins and destinations of profits in absolute terms. In this section, we focus on 
the distribution effects of profit shifting, and find that lower-income countries tend to lose 
more tax revenue relative to their total tax revenue. 
 
We first focus on profit shifting. While countries from all income groups lose similarly relative 
to their GDP, profit shifting takes place predominantly to high-income countries (Figure 5). 
This is expected, since the majority of tax havens are included in this group. Although we 
present results for both the misalignment and the logarithmic model, we argue that the 
results of the misalignment model might be more accurate for two reasons. First, we use all 
available data in the misalignment model, imputing missing data. As previously mentioned, 
countries often do not report on small countries, but group them together into categories (e.g. 
‘Other Africa’). For example, only South Africa and India report operations on Botswana 
(three and five MNCs respectively), while the remaining reporting countries group Botswana 
with other African countries. For the logarithmic model this leads to an underestimation of the 
losses of lower-income countries. For the misalignment model, we estimate the expected 
employees and revenue of all country pairs, and use this information to correct the amount of 
profit shifted more accurately (Section 2.4). While this only increases total profit shifted by 30 
per cent, it is key to estimating profit shifting in lower-income countries accurately. A second, 
closely related, reason in favour of the misalignment model is its observation that profits are 
less aligned with economic activity in lower-income countries (discussed in Section 4.1). 
We continue by looking at tax revenue loss (the product of profits shifted and the ETR) as a 
function of the total tax revenue in each income group and region (Figure 6). In general, we 
find that lower-income-countries – those in Africa and Latin America – tend to lose more tax 
revenue relative to their total tax revenue. Countries with low and middle per capita incomes 
(Figure 6), are thus the largest profit-shifting losers. MNCs shift an equivalent of 5.03 per 
cent (95% CI; 2.96-7.53) of their total tax revenue out of low-income countries, while 
receiving influxes equivalent to 0.28 per cent (0.004-0.89). On the other hand, high-income 
countries lose an equivalent of 1.01 per cent (0.57-1.35), while gaining 0.30 per cent (0.12-
0.76). The low gains for high-income countries contrast with the high flows of profits shifted in 
those countries (Figure 5). Furthermore, losses for lower-middle-income countries (2.49-
9.24) are also significantly higher than those of higher-income countries, while upper-middle-
income countries exhibit only moderate loses (0.38-3.78). 
 
Figure 5 Profits shifted as a percentage of GDP for countries in different income 








Figure 6 Tax revenue loss as a percentage of total tax revenue for countries in 
different income groups (top row) and different geographical regions (bottom row), as 
estimated by the misalignment (left side of graph) and logarithmic (right side of graph) 
models 
 
Note. Confidence intervals show 95% intervals, calculated via bootstrapping. 
 
 
When analysing each country separately (Figure 7), we once again find that lower-income 
countries lose significantly more tax revenue than high- and upper-middle-income countries. 
Similar results are found for comparisons of tax revenue losses with corporate income tax 
revenue (Figure A11) and GDP (Figure A12). There are, however, differences within lower-
income countries. In general, African countries tend to lose the higher share of their tax 
revenue to profit shifting (Figure A16). Our results confirm the theoretical arguments that 
lower-income countries are more vulnerable to profit shifting (Fuest et al. 2011; Hearson 
2018; Johannesen et al. 2020), and indicate that the previous lack of empirical confirmation 
may have driven by data limitations. 
 
Our analysis shows that only a small number of countries gain any tax revenue. Profit shifting 
is thus a phenomenon where the majority of countries lose, and especially so lower-income 
countries. The magnitude of the tax revenue loss in those countries can be better 
appreciated by comparing it with public expenditure. Lower-income countries loss the 
equivalent of 28.2-82.4 per cent of their government health expenditure (Figure A13), or 
8.65-31.9 per cent of their government education expenditure (Figure A14). 
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Figure 7 Tax revenue loss as a percentage of total tax revenue estimated with the 





Note. Each dot represents an individual country, and the median values are visualised with a dashed line. The data is split into 
low- and lower-middle-income countries (LowMiddle, light orange) upper-middle- and high-income countries (UpperHigh, darker 
red). The statistical differences between the median are assessed with a Mann-Whitney test. Significance level: p<0.05 (*), 
p<0.01 (**), p<0.001 (***). Only observations within a distance from the median of 5 interquartile ranges are shown. 
 
4.4 Robustness checks and sensitivity analyses 
 
We address the data and methodology limitations of this paper by testing the consistency of 
the main results to our methodological choices. In total, we carry out 12 robustness checks 
and sensitivity analyses. We briefly summarise them here.  
 
i. We use a variety of methodological approaches, including models based on linear, 
quadratic and logarithmic semi-elasticities, as well as the misalignment method. The 
scale of profit shifting is similar for all models (between US$0.9 and US$1.04 trillion), and 
the origin and destination of profits is broadly comparable (Sections 4.1 and 4.2).  
ii. We test the robustness of the 25 per cent ETR threshold in equation 5. Reducing the 
threshold to 20 per cent would reduce our estimate of profit shifting by the logarithmic 
model by 5 per cent. Increasing the threshold to 30 per cent would increase the estimate 
of profit shifting by 6 per cent.  
iii. We compare our results to those of Tørsløv et al. (2020), observing a high correlation 
with a much increased country sample (Figure D1).  
iv. We compare the tax revenue loss with a variety of benchmarks including, for example, 
GDP, total tax revenue and health expenditure (Figures A11–A14). We find that lower-
income countries lose comparatively the most in all specifications, as discussed above in 
4.3. These are the main sensitivity analyses of our methodology, and results that are not 
related to the data. 
 
We test the consistency of the main results to other methodological choices in four additional 
ways: 
 
i. We compare our results, in which we limit the sample to those countries that report 
information on at least eight offshore centres with the full sample. The effects on the 
estimated coefficient are minimal, the coefficient of log(0.0007 + ETR) becomes -0.8475 
(with standard deviation 0.1583), statistically indistinguishable from our estimated 0.8665 
(with standard deviation 0.1642) reported in Table 5.  
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ii. We analyse the sensitivity of our results to the offset in the logarithmic model, showing a 
robust estimation of the coefficients for a wide range of offsets (Figure D2). 
iii. We compare the logarithmic specification with other specifications that can accommodate 
extreme non-linearities, including 1/(τ + ETR)1, 1/(τ + ETR)2, 1/(τ + ETR)3  and coth(τ + 
ETR). The logarithmic specification allows for higher non-linearities, and exhibits a higher 
R2 and lowest Bayesian Information Criteria (see Table D1 and Figures D3 and D4). 
iv. We test a different redistribution formula. For this, we first regressed the share of profits 
booked in a country against the shares of employees, capital, sales and wages (Table 
D2). We then used the coefficients as our new redistribution formula, after normalising 
them to sum to one. Profit shifting is reduced by 7 per cent, with a similar distribution of 
the origin and destination of profits (Figure D5). 
 
Additional robustness checks and sensitivity analyses focus on the data itself and, in 
particular, on missing data imputation. In accordance with the design of the individual 
methods, this missing data imputation does not affect our preferred semi-elasticity methods 
of estimating the scale of profit shifting, but only influences the measures of misalignment 
and the subsequent redistribution of the shifted profit for all methods:  
 
i. We estimate missing data using 1,000 bootstrapped data samples (Section 3.2) to show 
the consistency of our results in relation to variations in data coverage. In the main 
results we use the median of the samples. The confidence intervals are included in 
Figure A15.  
ii. We compare the location of employees and revenue according to our missing data model 
with the information in the original data as well as GDP, showing how our method 
addresses the limitations of these two alternatives (Figure A5).  
iii. We compare our missing data imputation method with other models, including with 
penalised linear regression (Appendix E), showing that our method has higher predictive 
power. 
iv. Finally, we run a robustness test in which the data of China was not adjusted. This 
decreases profit shifted by 9 per cent, especially reducing profit shifted towards China. 
 
These robustness checks and sensitivity analyses show how our results are robust to 
changes in the methodology. 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
Exploiting the combination of a new methodology and a new dataset, we establish that 
MNCs shifted US$1 trillion of profits to tax havens in 2016, which in turn implies US$200-300 
billion in revenue losses for other countries. Moreover, we estimate that MNCs 
headquartered in the US and Bermuda are the most aggressive in profit shifting. We then 
turn to the distributional impacts of profit shifting. Our results show that existing linear and 
quadratic models underestimate the profit shifting to countries with extremely low tax rates, 
and at the same time overestimate it for countries with moderate rates. Conversely, the new 
logarithmic model (theoretically grounded) and the misalignment model (based on extreme 
ratios of profit per economic activity) are able to accurately capture this behaviour. Using the 
two models, we show that around 40 per cent and 85-90 per cent of profit shifted is shifted to 
countries with an ETR below 1 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. Finally, we show that 
while profit shifting affects both lower- and higher-income countries, lower-income countries 
lose a higher share of their tax revenue due to profit shifting. Overall, our findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that MNCs exploit the combination of globalisation and the 
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sovereignty of individual countries, including tax havens, to avoid paying taxes, at the 
expense of countries worldwide at all levels of income. 
 
Two main lessons can be learned from our findings. First, the extremely non-linear 
relationship between the location of profits and tax rates has implications for both research 
and policy. In research, we show that accurately accounting for this relationship affects the 
estimated scale, as well as the distribution, of profit shifting. Accounting for the extreme non-
linearity shows that less than 10 per cent of profit shifting takes place to countries with ETRs 
above 10 per cent, versus 30 per cent of profit shifting if the non-linearity is not addressed. In 
policy, this modelling choice can highly affect our assessment of international tax reform, as 
may be the case in the assessment of the global minimum tax rate proposal (OECD 2020). 
The so-called Pillar Two proposes that MNCs with tax rates below the minimum tax rate in a 
jurisdiction would face a top-up tax. This would reduce the incentive for MNCs to shift profits 
to tax havens. The impact assessment estimates that the largest reduction of profit shifting 
will happen through those spillover effects of this minimum tax rate. However, the current 
methodology uses a linear model, and as such assumes that the incentives for profit shifting 
decrease linearly as the minimum ETR increases. Our results empirically show that MNCs 
tend to seek the jurisdiction with the lowest possible ETR – that is, the linearity assumption 
does not hold. It is therefore plausible that MNCs will continue shifting a similar share of their 
profits to countries offering the minimum ETR, or contrarily that the minimum tax rate will 
completely eliminate profit-shifting incentives. In reality, the specific value of the minimum tax 
rate will determine which of the two alternatives we are likely to see as an outcome. 
 
A second lesson arising from our results concerns the unequal impact of profit shifting across 
countries, with implications for research and policy on tax and development. In research, 
CBCR data of MNCs has been hailed as a potential panacea for the analysis of profit shifting 
from low-income countries to tax havens (Wójcik 2015). We provide a cautious, data-
supported answer, showing that lower-income countries tend to lose more tax revenue 
relative to total tax revenue compared to higher-income countries. Our results show that the 
aggregation of small countries in the data increases the uncertainty about the full effect of 
profit shifting in these countries. This could nudge lower-income countries’ governments into 
using confidential tax returns data for a more detailed profit shifting analysis – as South 
Africa recently did, and learnt that profit shifting is highly concentrated among a few large 
MNCs (Reynolds and Wier 2018). In policy, our results indicate that the current international 
tax system may be hindering the achievement of one of the goals of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development: to ‘strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, including through 
international support to lower-income countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and 
other revenue collection’ UN (2015). This supports the frequent arguments of lower-income 
countries that they should be represented on an equal footing when international corporate 
tax system reform is being debated and decided at the OECD or G20 forums, and, 
furthermore, that the reform itself should create a level playing field in the corporate taxation 
of MNCs. 
 
The analysis presented in this paper has a number of limitations that open up additional 
avenues for future research. We see two of them as especially fruitful. The first one is 
obtaining more accurate estimates as new CBCR data becomes available in the future. The 
next release is expected in July 2021, and is expected to have an even larger country 
coverage. The guidelines to report intra-company dividends have been updated, and the 
2019 data (expected in 2022) will contain no double counting. The second avenue is to 
obtain more accurate estimates of tax semi-elasticity using firm-level data. An increasing 
number of MNCs (e.g. Vodafone and Shell) are voluntarily publishing their own CBCR data, 
and more of them are likely to do so, or be forced to do so by governments, in the future. 
This firm-level data would enable us to understand even more accurately the extent of profit 
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Appendix A General supplementary figures 
Figure A1 Loss-making affiliates as a profit shifting strategy, using 2017 US data 
 
 
Note. The total profits made by profit-making affiliates is plotted against the percentage of profits offset by losses. Three types of 
countries are highlighted with boxes. In red are ‘profit centres’, reporting very high profits not offset by losses. In green are 
‘coordination centres’ (or conduits), reporting very high profits offset by losses. In blue are origin countries, reporting profits 
offset by losses. Only countries reporting at least US$10 billion profits are reported, the USA (profits of US$1,310 and offset 
ratio of 10% is excluded). Countries in red exhibit profitabilities above US$100,000 per employee. 
 
 




Note. Colour indicates the ETR (below or above 10%). Note that the x axis is logarithmic, and as such the effect of ETR on the 





Figure A3 Comparison of profits shifted out (A) and profits shifted in (B) for the 













Note. Countries with availability below 20% are annotated. All countries with availability below 10% are placed to the left of 





Figure A5 Comparison between the redistribution formula (eq. 8) (A) imputing 
missing data vs using raw data of firms with positive profits; (B) imputing missing 
data vs using share of GDP 
 
 
Note. The estimated shares of the economy for African countries are higher than the shares of the economy for those 




Figure A6 Relationship between GDP and domestic employees, sales and tangible 
assets for countries in 2016 OECD data 
 
 
Notes. Each dot corresponds to one country in the data. 
 
  













Figure A7 Relationship between the number of large MNCs (extracted from Orbis), 
and total profits reported domestically in the country 
 
Note. Estimated values using a regression with GDP, population, the average ETRs and the total consolidated banking claims 
on an immediate counterparty basis (Table B4 of the BIS data) are visualised in grey. Empirical values are visualised in blue. 
 
 
Figure A8 Graphical representation of Table 5 for the logarithmic, quadratic, linear 
and DLM models 
 
Note. (A, B) Marginal effect of ETR on profits. (C,D) Relative increase in profits due to profit shifting, compared with a 
country with an ETR of 25%. Plots B and D are close-ups of plots A and C respectively, constraining ETRs between 5 





Figure A9 Comparison of logarithmic and misalignment models 
 
 
Note. Isle of Man, Barbados and Gibraltar only appear for US-headquartered MNCs for the dataset on all sub-groups, with 
results on a higher estimate for the misalignment model. 
 
 
Figure A10 Graphical representation of Table 5 for logarithmic model, at country 
level 
 
Note. (A, B) Marginal effect of ETR on profits. (C,D) Relative increase in profits due to profit shifting, compared with a 





Figure A11 Tax revenue loss as a percentage of corporate income tax revenue 
 
 
   
Tax Revenue Loss (% Corporate Income Tax Revenue)Tax Revenue Loss (% Corporate Income Tax Revenue) 
 Misalignment Logarithmic model 
 
Note. Significance level: p<0.05 (*), p<0.01 (**), p<0.001 (***). Only observations within a distance from the median of 5 





Figure A12 Tax revenue loss as a percentage of GDP 
 
 
Note. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. Significance level: p<0.05 (*), p<0.01 (**), p<0.001 (***). Only observations within a 





Figure A13 Tax revenue loss as a percentage of health expenditure 
 
 
Note. Significance level: p<0.05 (*), p<0.01 (**), p<0.001 (***). Only observations within a distance from the median of 5 





Figure A14 Tax revenue loss as a percentage of government education 
expenditure 
 
Notes. Significance level: p<0.05 (*), p<0.01 (**), p<0.001 (***). Only observations within a distance from the median of 5 




Figure A15 Distribution of the scale of profit shifted estimated by misalignment 
model at country level 
 
 
Note. The largest origins (top two rows, in blue) and destinations (bottom two rows, in red) are shown. The variance 
observed is created by the bootstrapping process detailed in Section 3.2. Non-reporting countries (Germany (DEU), the 
UK (GBR), Cayman Islands (CYM) have higher uncertainty than reporting countries such as France (FRA), Italy (ITA) or 
Bermuda (BMU). The 5% percentile, the median, and the 95% percentile are annotated. 
 
 
Figure A16 Distribution of tax revenue losses for lower-income countries, 
visualised with a boxen plot 
 
 
Note. Countries are coloured by geographical region – green (Africa), blue (Asia), orange (South America), purple 
(Europe), yellow (Oceania), red (Caribbean Islands). A boxenplot is similar to a boxplot, but where the whiskers are 
replaced with smaller boxes. The central box visualises the interquartile range, leaving 25% of the data at each end. The 






Appendix B General supplementary tables 
 
Table B1 Number of jurisdictions available per country (aggregates excluded) 
 IND USA ZAF ITA MEX DNK CHN FRA LUX 
All sub-groups 163 137 127 103 102 96 90 83 80 
Sub-groups with positive profits 134 84 87 77 73 93 53 32 79 
 BMU AUS BEL IDN JPN CHL SGP CAN SVN 
All sub-groups 72 56 40 33 29 14 12 8 5 
Sub-groups with positive profits 57 39 32 26 12 11 22 3 5 
 POL AUT NLD NOR IRL SWE FIN KOR 
All sub-groups 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sub-groups with positive profits 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Note. Jurisdictions with 1 observation only report on domestic activities of MNCs. 
 
 
Table B2 Expected number of large MNCs headquartered in country (according to 
Orbis), number of companies observed in CBCR data (using all sub-groups), and 
ratio between the two 









China 583 82 7.11 AUS 111 110 1.01 
Denmark 69 39 1.77 US (2017) 1501 1548 0.97 
Bermuda 60 39 1.54 India 158 165 0.96 
Singapore 48 32 1.50 Norway 55 60 0.92 
US (2016) 1,501 1,101 1.36 Chile 29 32 0.91 
South Africa 58 44 1.32 Finland 48 54 0.89 
Japan 891 715 1.25 Netherlands 136 155 0.88 
Italy 151 130 1.16 Australia 64 73 0.88 
Indonesia 22 19 1.16 Belgium 45 54 0.83 
France 206 180 1.14 Poland 24 29 0.83 
Canada 179 160 1.12 Slovenia 5 7 0.71 
Korea 205 185 1.11 Mexico 40 74 0.54 
Sweden 95 88 1.08 Luxembourg 30 120 0.25 














TRG (M) PS PS 








TRG         TRG 






147,879 148,968 592 3039.55 99.27 56.86 482.43 165.44 276.75 
Netherlands 140,896 212,366 6,904 16.33 66.35 3.54 30.68 11.65 14.69 
China 94,385 1,000,565 15,385 0.76 9.43 0.63 3.31 4.53 6.61 
Hong Kong 90,199 160,805 5,953 28.69 56.09 13.42 31.96 25.77 55.20 
Bermuda 62,992 63,542 630 1059.50 99.13 49.55 420.41 144.17 641.01 
British Virgin 
Islands 
60,895 60,895 61 6361.74 100.00 30.01 254.62 87.31 171.26 
Switzerland 51,611 129,518 3,768 7.47 39.85 2.65 18.68 15.21 10.80 
Puerto Rico 42,565 44,639 426 41.37 95.35 1.93 16.41 5.63 6.59 
Gibraltar 29,815 29,815 0 1413.50 100.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Barbados 28,248 28,248 1,836 580.41 100.00 148.56 1486.94 1096.91 716.27 
Ireland 28,062 65,106 2,273 9.21 43.10 3.50 30.16 11.47 15.27 
Jersey 27,777 28,179 194 nan 98.57 nan nan nan nan 
Isle of Man 23,684 23,715 0 350.10 99.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Singapore 22,850 111,477 1,417 6.96 20.50 3.18 11.01 25.13 14.46 
Taiwan 21,367 72,656 3,932 3.59 29.41 3.09 26.20 8.99 15.03 
Vietnam 20,875 59,312 2,505 9.25 35.20 5.84 30.23 43.03 22.63 
Luxembourg 17,536 28,228 316 27.39 62.12 1.83 10.31 10.12 12.27 
Sweden 12,796 54,232 973 2.34 23.60 0.53 6.43 1.94 2.38 
Canada 9,651 147,347 820 0.56 6.55 0.18 1.44 0.62 0.90 
Chile 7,576 35,316 1,038 2.81 21.45 2.26 9.39 10.17 8.00 
Libya 7,117 7,769 1,423 15.08 91.61 202.63 90.84 78.76 161.48 
Denmark 6,483 34,730 960 1.93 18.67 0.62 10.71 3.33 3.58 
Cyprus 4,243 6,119 93 17.90 69.34 1.65 6.58 13.32 6.15 
Hungary 3,799 18,505 122 2.68 20.53 0.34 5.23 1.78 1.91 
Mauritius 3,745 4,643 131 28.14 80.65 5.40 40.86 44.62 22.48 
Malaysia 3,132 34,434 504 0.95 9.10 1.06 2.23 7.89 2.98 
Thailand 2,978 51,083 477 0.62 5.83 0.57 2.06 3.59 2.20 
Norway 2,455 34,035 601 0.56 7.21 0.46 1.86 1.67 1.83 
Kazakhstan 2,347 13,840 207 1.27 16.96 0.48 3.35 5.73 3.93 
New Zealand 1,652 13,008 302 0.86 12.70 0.49 3.44 2.17 2.35 
Curaçao 1,545 1,727 404 49.44 89.46 60.46 512.91 175.89 262.14 
Iraq 1,544 2,716 232 0.73 56.84 0.58 3.30 9.07 5.87 
Bolivia 1,385 2,603 427 3.78 53.23 3.81 22.07 30.66 40.88 
Myanmar 1,258 1,914 24 1.77 65.74 0.45 2.92 5.03 2.05 




Azerbaijan 1,100 2,863 52 2.08 38.43 0.72 2.43 8.84 3.81 
Jordan 777 2,531 129 1.94 30.71 2.12 12.96 7.24 8.79 
Croatia 744 3,855 28 1.30 19.29 0.21 2.36 0.82 1.10 
Panama 592 4,522 43 1.09 13.08 0.79 3.11 1.82 2.48 
Georgia 558 861 84 3.28 64.79 1.94 16.51 21.33 15.97 
Guinea 405 785 116 3.60 51.66 7.80 265.25 184.53 42.98 
Cambodia 353 1,024 30 1.57 34.48 1.01 6.19 10.01 7.34 
Monaco 353 1,241 2 5.33 28.42 0.15 1.27 1.95 2.24 
Burkina Faso 318 857 18 2.18 37.05 0.77 4.69 6.19 2.49 
Papua New  284 1,758 6 1.22 16.17 0.14 2.11 1.37 1.24 
Guinea 
Marshall 278 293 0 139.51 94.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Islands 
Maldives 261 296 84 5.42 88.15 9.93 48.75 32.77 45.46 
Guatemala 209 2,073 15 0.30 10.06 0.20 0.65 1.00 0.74 
Timor-Leste 110 169 0 7.07 65.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bhutan 91 169 15 4.04 53.51 4.68 9.81 26.48 10.50 
Faroe Islands 69 116 1 2.58 59.66 0.11 0.92 0.32 0.53 
Liberia 27 135 0 0.87 19.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bulgaria 24 2,763 0 0.04 0.85 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Afghanistan 18 35 1 0.09 52.04 0.09 0.61 1.54 0.21 
Vanuatu 1 2 0 0.12 42.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Note. Profits booked reflect all sub-groups. PS stands for profit shifted, TRG stands for tax revenue gain. We compare PS 
with the country’s GDP. We compare the TRG with the total tax revenue, the corporate tax revenue, and the public health 























Note. PS stands for profit shifted, TRL stands for tax revenue loss. We compare PS with the country’s GDP. We compare 




Table B5 Profits (in US$ million) reported by groups with positive profits (Profits 
(+)) and all groups (Profits (all groups)). ETRs accrued (signified with ‘a’) and cash-
























Note. Three types of ETRs were calculated, the weighted ETR by profits (ETRx (wmean)), the median (ETRx (median) 
and the weighted ETR by foreign profits (ETRx for (wmean). The number of countries disclosing data on the country (N. 




Appendix C Data-driven calculation of the effect of tax on profit shifting 
 
An alternative method of profit shifting analysis adopts a model-agnostic approach. Instead 
of fitting the data to a pre-determined model, we can use symbolic regression to search for 
models that fit the data well. The search space (i.e. potential models) in symbolic regression 
is, however, infinitely large. The state-of-the-art method uses evolutionary algorithms – 
algorithms inspired by biological evolution, widely used in optimisation problems, to find the 
best model, balancing the fitness of the model with its complexity in order to avoid overfitting. 
These algorithms start with a pool of solutions (in this case models), which are re-combined 
and mutated, increasing the pool of solutions. The best solutions found in this augmented 
pool are selected and allowed to be combined and mutated in the next generation. The 
algorithms efficiently explore the search space and reach a near-optimum solution. The main 
challenge in symbolic regression is how to score the solutions in order to find the best model, 
since using an error term alone will lead to finding highly complex models (overfitting). Here, 
we use the software Eureqa (Schmidt and Lipson 2009). In order to avoid overfitting, the 
software keeps the best model for each level of complexity, where the complexity is 
determined by the number of variables included and the operations (e.g. a log-transformation 
costs 4 units, an addition cost 1 unit) and the best model by the R2. The model ‘profits = 20’ 
is very simple, but has a very low R2. A model with 20 variables interacting with each other 
may be able to fit the data perfectly, but will most likely result in data overfitting. 
 
The model tries to find the best model for the location of profits, based on the following 
variables: revenue from unrelated party, employment, tangible assets, ETR, log(ETR), 
wages, population, gross fixed capital formation, consumption, gdp, tax complexity, 
statatistical capacity, and revenue resources. The first five variables come from CBCR, 
wages are approximated as employment*gdp/population, the last variable from the ICTD / 
UNU-WIDER Government Revenue Dataset 2018, and the rest from the World Bank. We do 
not include revenue from related parties since it is heavily affected by profit shifted. 
Employees and tangible assets are less relevant to tax avoidance structures. All variables 
except for the last three are log-transformed. While the evolutionary algorithm can transform 
variables, that transformation is costly and seldom found. 
 
We let the algorithm run for 20 hours using eight CPU cores, until it reached a ‘Percent 
Coverage’ of 100 per cent; ‘Percent Coverage is actually designed to replace the older 
stability and maturity metrics by providing an improved estimate of how close the search is to 
the plateau point where continuing the search will most likely not turn up any better solutions. 
It is based on the early stopping rule of thumb estimate and tracks how long has it been 
since any significant improvement on the validation data set.’ (Eureqa documentation). 
 
Figure C1 shows the variables included in at least one model. Our dependent variable (pi) is 
logically included in all models. Revenue from unrelated party and ETRs were almost always 
included, while tangible assets, revenue from natural resources, expenses/GDP and wages 
were only included in more complicated models. The absence of statutory corporate income 
tax in all models is perhaps surprising. 
 
Figure C2 shows the relationship between logπ and the ETR. We see an extreme non-linear 
relationship for all models, independently of their complexity. In general, when the ETR is 1 
per cent, the profits increase 6 to 14 times in comparison with the minimum. Interestingly, all 
models allowed for a U-curve, and the minimum effect found is achieved when ETR is 20 per 






Figure C1 Variables found in the models 
 
 
Note. 25 different models were found, and unrelated party revenues, ETRs, and tangible assets were found in the 
majority of them. 
 
Figure C2 The found dependency between the ETR and profits is visualised 
 
 





Appendix D Sensitivity analysis, extra information 
 
Figure D1 Comparison with estimates of profit shifting by Tørsløv et al. (2020) 
 
 
Note. Countries not included in the sample of Tørsløv et al. (2020) appear in the left of the plots. Estimates of profits shifted 
using the misalignment model are visualised in blue. Estimates using the logarithmic model are visualised in grey. A light grey 
line is used to connect the blue and grey points corresponding to the same country. 
 
 
Figure D2 Effect of the parameter t in the logarithmic model 
 
Note. (A) The coefficient of log (t + ETR) is affected by the election of t. (B) The effect of t  on our estimate of total profits shifted 
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Table D1 Regression table using US data and applying other specifications that allow 
for extreme non-linearities. A graphical visualisation is presented in Figure D3 
 log(ETR) 1/(ETR)1 1/(ETR)2 1/(ETR)3 coth(ETR)) 
log(0.0014 + ETR) -1.5176*** 
(0.1920) 
    
(0.0260 + ETR)-1  0.1502*** 
(0.0218) 
   
(0.0580 + ETR)-2   0.0169*** 
(0.0025) 
  
(0.0940 + ETR)-3    0.0040*** 
(0.0006) 
 
coth(0.0260 + ETR)     0.1502*** 
(0.0218) 
ETR  2.6417** 1.9011* 1.6490 2.5927** 
  (1.1588) (1.0794) (1.0534) (1.1535) 
Intercept -6.8326*** 1.6570* 2.2231** 2.3595** 1.6555* 
 (2.0061) (0.9598) (0.9585) (0.9591) (0.9598) 
ETR 5.5093*** 
(1.4594) 
    
log(Population) 0.3694*** 
(0.1051) 
    
log(GDPpc) 0.4721*** -0.0101 -0.0080 -0.0063 -0.0101 
 (0.1628) (0.0934) (0.0932) (0.0931) (0.0934) 
log(Tangible Assets) 0.4874*** 0.5426*** 0.5424*** 0.5432*** 0.5426*** 
 (0.0748) (0.0776) (0.0775) (0.0775) (0.0776) 
log(Wages) 0.1617* 0.3564*** 0.3555*** 0.3542*** 0.3564*** 
 (0.0929) (0.0820) (0.0818) (0.0817) (0.0820) 
N 91 91 91 91 91 
R2 0.899 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.884 





Figure D3 Graphical representation of Table D1 for log(τ + ETR), 1/(τ + ETR), 1/(τ + 





Note: Semi-elasticities calculated using US data. The τ  offset is calculated independently for all 
models. (A, B) Marginal effect of ETR on profits. (C,D) Relative increase in profits due to profit shifting, compared with a 




Figure D4 Graphical representation of Table D1 for the model with extra dummies 




Note. Semi-elasticities are calculated using US data. (A, B) Marginal effect of ETR on profits. (C,D) Relative increase in profits 
due to profit shifting, compared with a country with an ETR of 25%. Plots B and D are close-ups of plots A and C, constraining 
ETRs between 5 and 50%. 
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Table D2 Results of a robust linear model, where share of profits booked in a country 
is regressed against shares of employees, capital, sales and wages 
 
 Share of profits 
Share of employees 0.0315*** 
(0.0007) 
Share of capital 0.1188*** 
(0.0004) 
Share of sales 0.6598*** 
(0.0007) 





Note: We used data on sub-groups with positive profits to reduce effect of profit shifting. 
 
 
Figure D5 Profits shifted in and out of countries using CBCR data, estimated with 
misalignment, logarithmic (Log), quadratic (Quad), linear (Linear) and DLM (Linear-




Note. MNCs shift profits from countries with negative shifted profits to countries with positive shifted profits. The largest origins 
of the profits are visualised in blue, and the largest destinations in red. All other countries are visualised together in grey. The 
annotations indicate the percentage of profit shifted out of the country (compared to estimated profits) or into the country 




Appendix E Modelling missing employees and revenue 
 
We train the location of profits, employees and sales using variables from the gravity dataset 
of CEPII, World Bank data (WBD), United Nations data (UN), International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), UN COMTRADE database (COMTRADE), Linkedin, Tax Justice Network financial 
secrecy and corporate tax haven indexes (TJN), Bank of International Settlements (BIS), 
International Labour Organization (ILO), World Health Organization (WHO), and Government 
Revenue Dataset (UNU-WIDER GRD). A complete list of variables can be found at the end 
of this Annex. 
 
We used these variables to predict the location of employees and revenue. We tested 
several models, and a Histogram-based Gradient Boosting Regression Tree – a type of 
gradient boosting based on decision trees, which frequently outperforms other machine 
learning algorithms while offering some interpretability on the most relevant variables 
(Friedman 2001; Ke et al. 2017) – was shown to perform the best. A sample of the prediction 
power of the algorithm is visualised in Figure E1, and a comparison with Lasso regression in 
Figure E2. Since Lasso does not have native support for missing values, these are imputed 
using the sklearn function IterativeImputer, which provides a strategy for imputing missing 
values by modelling each variable as a function of other variables in a round-robin fashion. 
 
Finally, we investigated which variables were more important in the estimation using 
permutation feature importance (Breiman 2001). The permutation feature importance is 
defined as the decrease in the R-square of the model when the values of a variable are 
randomly shuffled. We permutated the values of the original data (i.e. not of the 1000 
bootstrap samples) 100 times to get a confidence interval, which is visualised in Figure E3. 
For the estimation of profits (ln_pi, not used in the paper), we find that outward FDI and 
Portfolio Investment are the most important variables. For the estimation of employees 
(ln_emp) and sales (ln_revt), outward FDI and Exports are the most important predictors. 
Importantly, we are not trying to rationalise the variables chosen by the algorithm, just to 
create an accurate model to impute missing values. 
 
 




Note. In-sample estimations are depicted in light grey, while out-of sample estimations of employees, unrelated party sales and 
tangible assets are visualised in blue. Note that this is one split of the data. The cross-validated r-squares are displayed in the 







Figure E2 A penalised linear regression model was fit on 60% of the sample and tested 
in the other 40% 
 
 
Note. In-sample estimations are depicted in light grey, while out-of sample estimations of employees, unrelated party sales and 




Figure E3 Permutation Importance of each variable for the prediction of profits (ln_pi, 






Table E1 Variables and data sources used to model missing employees and revenue 
 
Variable Description Source 
iso3 ISO-3 code N/A 
revt, emp, pi, txc Revenue, employees, profits and cash taxes CBCR 
   
Bilateral Variables 
  
ln_Import Log of total imports from origin to destination COMTRADE 
ln_Export Log of  total exports from origin to destination COMTRADE 
ln_FDI_inward Log of total FDI from orogin to destination IMF CDIS 
ln_FDDI_outward Log of total FDI from destination to origin IMF CDIS 
ln_PortI_inward Log of total portfolio investment from orogin to destination IMF CPIS 
ln_PortI_outward Log of total portfolio investment from destination to origin IMF CPIS 
ln_dClaims Log of total banking claims (derived from partners) BIS Table A6.2 
ln_dLiabilities Log of total banking liabilities (derived from partners) BIS Table A6.2 
ln_distw Ln of distance between countries CEPII GravData 
tdiff Time zones difference (hours) CEPII GravData 
transition_legalchange Dummy, 1 if common legal origin changed since transition CEPII GravData 
eu_to_acp 
Dummy,  EU/member exporting to an ACP country (a preferential trade 
agreement on imports) CEPII GravData 
acp_to_eu 
Dummy, ACP country exporting to an EU/member (a preferential trade 
agreement on imports) CEPII GravData 
col45 Dummy, colonial relationship post 1945 CEPII GravData 
col_fr Dummy, origin of colonial relationship post 1945 CEPII GravData 
col_to Dummy, destination of colonial relationship post 1945 CEPII GravData 
colony Dummy, colonial relationship (ever) CEPII GravData 
comcol Dummy, common colonizer post 1945 CEPII GravData 
comcur Dummy, common currency CEPII GravData 
comlang_ethno Dummy, common language (>9% population) CEPII GravData 
comlang_off Dummy, common official language CEPII GravData 
comleg_posttrans Dummy, common legal origins after transition CEPII GravData 
comleg_pretrans Dummy, common legal origins before transition CEPII GravData 
comrelig Religious proximity index CEPII GravData 
contig Dummy, contiguity CEPII GravData 
curcol Dummy, current colonial relationship CEPII GravData 
cursib Dummy, current sibling relationship (common colonizer) CEPII GravData 
sibling Dummy, ever sibling relationship (common colonizer) CEPII GravData 
fta_wto Dummy, regional trade agreement (WTO) CEPII GravData 
gsp Dummy if donator in Generalized System of Preferences CEPII GravData 
heg_o Dummy, 1 if origin is current of former hegemon of destination CEPII GravData 
heg_d Dummy, 1 if destination is current of former hegemon of origin CEPII GravData 
gsp_d_d Dummy, 1 if origin is donator in Generalized System of Preferences CEPII GravData 
gsp_o_d Dummy, 1 if destination is donator in Generalized System of Preferences CEPII GravData 
      
Unilateral Variables: Included for the reporting and partner countries 
Legislative/historical/Geographical 
  
entry_proc Start-up procedures to register a business (Number) CEPII GravData 
entry_time Time required to start a business (days) CEPII GravData 
entry_tp Days+Procedures to start a business CEPII GravData 
gatt GATT member CEPII GravData 
EU28 Dummy, country belonging go the EU-28 N/A 
OECD Dummy, country belonging go the OECD N/A 
Ukt Dummy, UK-territory N/A 
region_tjn Region  TJN 
ln_area Log of area in sq. kms CEPII GravData 
ln_entry_cost Log of cost of business start-up procedures (log of % GNI per capita) CEPII GravData 
english Official language 1 in the CEPII GeoDist dataset CEPII GeoDist 
governance 
First PCA component of the six dimensions of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators project 
WBD 
   
Socio-economic and financial  
  




Physicians_per_1000 Doctors per 1000 inhabitants WBD 
ln_Nurses Log of number of nurses 
 
ln_physician Log of number of doctos 
 
ln_pop Population (source CEPII) CEPII GravData 
ln_population Population (source WBD) WBD 
ln_POP_int Population (manually completed) Following order of 
preference: WBD, UN, 
CIA, manually 
completed ln_GDP_int GDP (manually completed) 
ln_gdp_d GDP CEPII GravData 
ln_gdpcap_d GDP per capita CEPII GravData 
ln_gdppc_d GDP per capita 
ln_GDP_int - 
ln_POP_int 
ln_Health_expenditure_gdp Log of health expenditure (% of gdp) WBD 
ln_uhnwi 
Log10 of the number of high net worth individuals (adults with wealth 
above 50 millions) 
Global Wealth Report 
2018 by Credit Suisse 
ratings 
Trading Economic credit rating, composed from the credit ratings by 
Moody’s, S&P, Fitch and DBRS 
Feb. 2019 
tradingeconomics.com 
ln_n_companies_orb Log of number of MNCs with a turnover higher than 750M in Orbis Orbis 
ln_GreenfieldFDI_inward Total greenfield FDI into the country UNCTAD  
ln_GreenfieldFDI_outward Total greenfield FDI out of the country UNCTAD  
ln_BIS 
Log of total consolidated banking claims on an immediate counterparty 
basis  BIS (Table B4) 
ln_ExternalDebtStocks Log of External Debt Stock WBD 
ln_consumption 
Log10 of final consumption expenditure by households and non-profit 
institutions serving households (constant 2010 USD) 
Mean 2014-2018 
NE.CON.PRVT.KD 
ln_gfcf Log10 of gross fixed capital formation (constant 2010 USD) 
Mean 2014-2018 
NE.GDI.FTOT.KD  
ln_FDI_Inflows_WDI_d Log of total FDI inflows WBD 
ln_imports_wbd Log of total imports in the country WBD 
ln_ip_payments_wbd Log of IP payments in the country WBD 
ln_ip_receipts_wbd Lof of IP receipts in the country WBD 
ln_exports_wbd Log of total exports in the ocuntry WBD 
ln_month_wage Log of monthly wage ILO 
ln_govt_exp_educ_sgdp_wb Log of government expenditure in education (%GDP) WBD 
ln_who_gvt_health_expenditure Log og public expenditure in health care WHO 
ln_cit_revenue Log of government revenue from corporate income tax UNU - WIDER GRD 
ln_resource_revenue Log of government revnue from resource taxes and fees UNU - WIDER GRD 
ln_resource_taxes Log of government revnue from resource taxes UNU - WIDER GRD 
ln_resource_revenue_gdp Log of government revnue from resource taxes and fees (% GDP) UNU - WIDER GRD 
ln_total_taxes_revenue Log of total government revenue from taxes UNU - WIDER GRD 
   
Secrecy and tax 
  
Total FSI Financial Secrecy Score TJN 
cit Statutory Corporate Income tax rates 
Mean 2014 - 2018, 
Janský, Petr; Palanský, 
Miroslav (2019) 
cthi Corporate Tax Haven Score TJN 
etr_real 
Effective tax rate, capped at 0.6 and using CIT for missing and negative 
values. CBCR weighted average 
ln_cit Log of cit KPMG, EY, PwC 
ln_etr_real Log of etr_real CBCR weighted average 
tax_complex Time to prepare and pay taxes (hours) 
Mean 2014 - 2018, 
IC.TAX.DURS (WBD) 





ln_all_tax Log of number of all tax professionals 
ln_audience Log of number of linkedin users 
ln_banker Log of number of bankers 
ln_ceo Log of number of CEOs 
ln_cfo Log of number of CFOs 
ln_coo Log of number of COOs 
ln_cxo Log of number of Chief Executives 
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ln_engineer Log of number of engineers in country 
ln_finance Log of number of finance workers 
ln_other_corporate Log of number of corporate tax professionals 
ln_wealth Log of number of wealth managers 
ln_transfer_pricing Log of number of transfer pricing specialists 
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